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Occasional Reflections
ON THE
IMPORTANCE
OF THE
WAR in *AMERICA*,
And the Reasonableness and Justice of
Supporting the King of Prussia, &c.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

Occaſional REFLECTIONS

ON THE

IMPORTANCE

OF THE

WAR in *AMERICA*,

And the REASONABLENESS and JUSTICE of

Supporting the KING of PRUSSIA, &c.

In DEFENCE of the

COMMON CAUSE.

Founded on

A GENERAL VIEW of the State and Connections of this Country; the General Syſtem of *Europe*; and the ambitious Deſigns of *French* Policy for overturning the Ballance of Power and Liberties of *Europe*.

In a LETTER to a MEMBER of PARLIAMENT.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following ſheets were written on a particular occaſion; but the reflections contained in them are of a general nature, and relate to things which appear to be pretty much connected with the real intereſts of this country.

OCCASIONAL REFLECTIONS, &c.

SIR, *London, June 2, 1757.*

A LATE incident recalled my thoughts to an important queſtion, which has often been the ſubject of our mutual ſpeculations: and as it has rather confirmed my opinion, I beg leave now to ſubmit to your candid judgment thoſe conſiderations which have the greateſt weight with me; that, if I am not able to give you ſatisfaction in any of the points wherein we differ, I may at leaſt put it in your power to oblige me with freſh proofs of your ſuperior abilities and knowlege in theſe matters, and to correct my errors and miſtakes.

There was lately a debate in the H—— of L——s upon the King's meſſage, the avowed

purpoſe whereof was, a vote of credit for a million of money, when the addreſs moved for met with ſome oppoſition: not ſo much, as I underſtood, with an intention to obſtruct the grant, as to point out an appropriation of it, by which his Majeſty would have been reſtrained from applying any part of it towards the ſupport of the *Common Cauſe*, or the aſſiſtance of any particular Princes or States upon the Continent: which brought the reaſoning directly to the point I now propoſe to ſubject to your view.

I was pleaſed to hear a thing of that kind managed more in the way of argument than debate, as, I own, I think it was neither a ſeaſon nor a ſubject for diſſention, whatever occaſion there might be to deliberate, or even to expoſtulate. At the ſame time I was glad, ſince there was any doubt ſtirred, to hear the L———s not only give their opinions, but their reaſons, in ſupport of the meaſure in its full extent: and the rather, that certainly his Majeſty, who knows what paſſes, is ſuſceptible of all the pleaſure, and ſubject to all the anxiety and concern, that, as the true Father of his people, he can ſuffer or enjoy in matters eſſential to their happineſs, and is therefore entitled to receive

from

from his great Council all the conſolation it can give him; to know, that they are as heartily touched, as he ſeems to be, with the preſent critical ſituation of public affairs; that the real intereſt of their country is the chief object of their attention and ſtudy; that they are duly ſenſible of his paternal regard, and are no leſs deſirous to know, than zealouſly reſolved, with ſteadineſs and fortitude, coſt what it will, to purſue, thoſe meaſures that may moſt effectually conduce to the ſafety and ſecurity of the nation, againſt the machinations and attempts of thoſe powers, be they never ſo great and formidable, whoſe ambition prompts them to think of forging chains for our necks, or of wreathing a yoke of ſervitude upon any other part of the world, with which we are in the leaſt degree connected by intereſt, blood, religion, or even humanity alone.

I know it would have been the meaning of that great aſſembly to do ſo, by whatever addreſs they ſhould, on ſuch an occaſion, preſent; but as it has not been uſual, ſeldom would be practicable, and perhaps never proper, to be very particular in addreſſes of that ſort; it ſeemed the more decent, if not neceſſary, for them in a critical conjuncture like

this, to declare their ſentiments ſo fully among themſelves, as that not only there could be no doubt what was the mind of the H——e, but that, ſo far as was conſiſtent with the rules of P————t, the Throne itſelf might underſtand what was intended by the words uſed in approaching it.

It was with pleaſure, therefore, that I heard ſo many of them explain their ſentiments freely. In this they both imitated the candour, and emulated the abilities of a noble L—d, with a B—r in the M————y, who always ſhines, and, with his uſual frankneſs and ſpirit, ſaid he would ſpeak out, and ſpeak all out, conſcious that there was nothing deſigned that needed to ſhun the light.

I did not find by what dropt from any L—d, that there was one of them who called in queſtion the propriety or expediency of the thing itſelf, which they were all ſenſible was the ſcope of the meſſage. And indeed I ſhould have much wondered if there had been a difference of opinion there, as, I think, he muſt be blind to the ſituation we are in at preſent, or, which is yet worſe, loſt to any feeling for his country (a caſe ſo alien to the human mind, that God forbid it ſhould ever be found in noble breaſts, where

it is natural for virtue to reſide), who could ſo far diſagree with the tendency of his Majeſty's gracious meſſage, the principles whereof appear to be not only juſt but obvious, and the concluſion from them no leſs clear and neceſſary.

His Majeſty tells his people "that this is a critical conjuncture." And is it not ſo? If the moſt valuable Intereſts of theſe kingdoms being at ſtake, we may ſay in hazard, and great events hanging as it were on a ſingle thread, do make a criſis, we are now in it; nor can it be denied, nay, if the other be true, what he further ſays muſt be ſo; "That "emergencies may ariſe which may be of "the utmoſt importance." And if they ariſe, it is beyond doubt what is added, "That they may be attended with the moſt "pernicious conſequences, if proper means "ſhould not be (and be *immediately*) applied "to prevent or defeat them." What then follows? What can follow, But that meaſures ſhould be taken to ſecure theſe means, His Majeſty therefore ſays, "He is deſirous" (nor can he be more ſo than every good ſubject ought to be) "that he be enabled to take "all ſuch meaſures as may be neceſſary to

"diſappoint

" diſappoint or defeat any enterprize or de-
" ſigns of his enemies." A deſire ſo juſt, ſo reaſonable, and of ſuch moment to the nation, that a H——e of P——t could not but agree to it, and do what in them lay to make it effectual.

But, I apprehend, it was the words with which the meſſage concluded, that alone could furniſh occaſion for any diverſity of ſentiment, it being added, " and as the exi-
" gency of affairs may require." A noble L—d, therefore, to whoſe zeal for the welfare of his country all poſſible applauſe is due, as there is not the ſmalleſt doubt of its ſincerity, ſaid a vote of credit might be often proper; he admitted it might be ſo now, and ſo far was willing to concur with his Majeſty's views, and the inclinations of ſuch as declared for the addreſs that had been moved; but his L——p argued for ſuch a limitation as I mentioned, which led my noble L—d to conſider what were the exigencies of affairs that might, and, in his opinion, ought to require the application of the means propoſed by this meaſure to be put into his Majeſty's hands, for enabling him to diſappoint or defeat the enterprizes or deſigns

of

of his enemies. And it was there the difference lay between his L——p and the others who ſupported the motion for an addreſs, as at firſt made.

The two great objects that diſtract, I do believe only becauſe they concur, for I am perſuaded that the leaſt favoured of them would be conſidered as of the greateſt conſequence to the nation, if there were not another that to ſome appears yet more material and intereſting, I ſay the two grand objects are, *America* and the *Continent*, and particularly the King of *Pruſſia*, Electorate of *Hanover*, and Prince of *Heſſe-Caſſel*.

Now it ſeems to be only the latter of thoſe, I mean the *Continent*, that makes any ground of diſpute; for as to *America*, I dare ſay every body is agreed, it is an object of ſuch magnitude as cannot be forgot or neglected—And indeed, unleſs it were to be the ſubject of a queſtion, Whether we are to give up our exiſtence as a nation, it never can be matter of ſpeculation, whether *America* is to be defended and ſupported?——Our exiſtence I ſay as a nation, I mean a commercial and independent Nation; or, in other words, Whether we ſhall ceaſe to be a free and happy people?——For by trade we do,

and

and muſt, if at all, ſubſiſt; without it we can have no wealth; and without wealth we can have no power; as without power we can have no liberty (which makes us even indebted to trade for that ineſtimable bleſſing). Theſe are twin ſiſters, never to be ſeparated, elſe they both die.

It is trade that ſecures liberty, not only becauſe it brings, but becauſe it diſtributes and divides riches and power, which are the ſure pillars of independency: it diſſipates and diffuſes an equality of wealth amongſt the people; and it is this wealth that in the total or aggregate of it, makes a nation powerful in reference to other countries, and conſequently free and independent as to them; at the ſame time that the happy diſtribution of it does, in reſpect of the internal ſyſtem, ſecure againſt national or domeſtic tyranny, oppreſſion, and ſlavery, which are the neceſſary conſequences of the property, which will always draw the power with it, being in the hands of a few, and poverty the portion of the reſt.

On our trade therefore depends our *all*; and how much our trade depends on our dominions in *America*, he muſt be a ſtranger to this country that does not know. It is to

our

our plantations and colonies that by far the greateſt part of thoſe manufactures go, which employ the ſkill and labour of the people of *Great Britain*; as it is from our colonies that, in return for theſe manufactures ſo exported, we draw great abundance of thoſe commodities which are their native growth, and cannot be produced at home, but are highly ſerviceable to us, and of which we re-export great quantities, beyond what is ſufficient for our own conſumption, to other countries; whence we get money or goods for them, and ſo form the connections of commerce with other nations. And in the ſame manner we have many things from our plantations, which are the materials of our home manufactures, the various branches and working up of which employ the induſtry and genius of our people, for the ſupply of foreign markets, from which we have proper returns.

In carrying on this grand circulation of commerce, of which the *Britiſh* empire in *America* is the parent, though this is the mother-country, of what extent is our ſhipping! which again conſtitutes our glory and ſecurity, our figure and felicity, as the firſt maritime power in the world. A character

which trade alone gave us, which it alone can preſerve to us, and without which we ſhould be on a level almoſt with the loweſt of the ſtates of *Europe*.

Theſe I conſider as the things which make *America* of that conſequence we all acknowlege it is; and I am ſo thoroughly convinced of their importance, that I think it impoſſible my zeal for *America* can be much inferior to theirs who ſpeak the warmeſt on that ſubject. I wiſh that every one, as well thoſe in public truſt as others, thought juſtly on the vaſt moment *America* is of to us. Theſe are words which are in the mouths of many, but, as is often found, without proper ideas, at leaſt without their being poſſeſſed of the knowlege, which is the proper foundation of the opinion they declare: and therefore perhaps it is, that this doctrine, however inconteſtable in itſelf, has not always had its due influence on the ſyſtem of our domeſtic affairs. I ſhall not at preſent pretend to examine how far may be owing to that fatal error, however excuſable in what firſt gave riſe to it (as I am not without ſuſpicion that there were faults in our colonies abroad that produced the error at home); I ſhall not, I ſay, at preſent examine, how far ſome of the diſtreſſes

we

we now labour under may be owing to that error. I ſee no advantage in looking back on faults with any other deſign than to correct and amend them: but a proper attention to ſome of theſe things ſeems neceſſary for our future guidance.

It might alſo be of ſome uſe to the public ſervice, that our commercial people too ſhould know that their intereſts are not quite overlooked by thoſe who are not immediately engaged in trade, though nobody is independent on it, but, on the contrary, greatly and directly connected with it, as being that which conſtitutes the value of the land property of the nation.

Every one, therefore, muſt be ſenſible of the value of *America*. If we are, we muſt of neceſſity be awake to the importance of the preſent war, the true cauſe of which is *America*: and, if I miſtake not, the real diſpute which has produced the war, and is to be determined by that laſt of arguments, the reaſon and the judge of Kings, is, Whether this country ſhall, either in whole or in part, loſe the advantage, and perhaps be ſtript even of the property, of its colonies; and, which is yet worſe, whether our moſt ancient and inveterate enemy, our moſt formi-

dable rival in trade and in our maritime power, is to gain what we loſe? A queſtion that, methinks, may make the ears of an *Engliſhman* tingle; for, in truth, it is little leſs than, Whether he, and his poſterity after him, ſhall continue to be free *Britons*; or whether we ſhall now become the vaſſals, if not the ſlaves, of a power I chuſe not to deſcribe, but of which we all know what is to be expected.

We are embarked in a war, the moſt important *Britain* ever was engaged in: a war begotten of true *Britiſh* principles, pure commercial views:—And ſo far let us rejoice, it is a juſt, as it was a neceſſary and unavoidable, war.

The laſt war with *Spain* took its riſe from *America* too: but it was a ſad one, the very bane of this country. It brought on the *French* war, and all the train of dreadful conſequences that enſued. It was indeed the war of the people: but they are not always in the right; though perhaps they do not continue, for the moſt part, a great while in the wrong. And I ſuſpect now, when conſidered with cool reflection, that muſt appear one of their blunders. In the light I view the matter, it was a ſenſeleſs war. I doubt, and always did, if it had much

much pretenſion to be called a juſt one. It was a war for what never could be decided by arms, for a purpoſe never to be compaſſed at all: either to obtain a free commerce with the *Spaniſh* dominions in *America* (a thing wiſe people that love *Britain* might wiſh for, but that even fools can hardly expect the *Spaniards* will ſo far exceed them in folly as to agree to); or it was to aſcertain, whether the *Spaniſh* guardacoſta's, or the *Britiſh* traders, did the greateſt number of illegal things, or the moſt grievous wrongs: an affair which might have been the cauſe of precautions, or the object of a negociation, conferences, or a treaty, which, if managed with a proper ſpirit, might have produced the deſired end; but hardly could be a wiſe reaſon for declaring war with a nation, whoſe connections in trade are ſo valuable to us.

But the preſent war is, in ſhort, Whether *France* ſhall expel us from dominion in *America*, and from commerce with that part of the world, and take all that we now poſſeſs of *American* property, trade, and navigation, from *Britain*, and throw it into the ſcale of *French* power. What muſt be the conſequence? This country muſt of neceſſity be poor, dependent, nay, a province to *France*.

And

And if we go, others too muſt add to the coſt of the ſacrifice. The iſſue of the conteſt is dreadful, not to *Britain* only, but to *Europe*.

Thus far then, I dare ſay, I ſhould have the honour to agree in opinion with the noble L——d who firſt found fault with the motion as made: and I ſhould imagine the ſame principles that produce a conformity of ſentiment upon the one point, would prevent any difference as to the other. For, as matters ſtand, the more I conſider the thing with as great impartiality, and as free of byaſs, I think, as poſſible, the more I am confirmed in the opinion, that it is impoſſible for us, if we would preſerve a juſt regard to our intereſt, and to the grand object of the war—*America*, to detach ourſelves from the *Continent* of *Europe*, or even to reſt ſatisfied with giving aſſiſtance to the powers now engaged in alliance with us in *Germany*, in any leſs degree, than with the utmoſt exertion of our whole ſtrength. I think it is apparent that the connections we at preſent have with the Continent, and which call for our interpoſition, or tend to engage us in continental meaſures, as they are called, are, in truth, no other than our own intereſts; and

that

that the war, ſo far as concerns us, is the ſame, both in the principle or cauſe of it, and in its conſequences, whether in *America* or on the Continent.

This may ſeem a paradox. Nor am I unaware of the ridicule ſuch a ſaying may be expoſed to amongſt thoſe who in former times have been accuſtomed to hear or talk of the Continent, continental meaſures, *German* connections, and all the other hard words which have been uſed in arguments of this ſort with no ſmall degree of warmth: but I am not at all afraid of that clamour at preſent, with any body at leaſt who conſiders things, not names, or that goes deeper than the ſurface of affairs, ſo as to be able to diſcover the difference of ſeaſons and circumſtances.

I will not approve of all that has been either ſaid or done ſometimes as to the Continent. Perhaps if I had had the honour of giving an opinion in ſome of the queſtions relating to it, I ſhould not have been of the ſide I may be ſuppoſed to take now. But, whatever was the caſe during the laſt war, and even admitting, though it is not to my preſent purpoſe to diſcuſs that matter ſo fully as it ought, in order to receive a proper judgement;

ment; admitting, I ſay, that our connections with the Continent laſt war were erroneous, or that we hurt ourſelves by aſſiſting others, for whom we were not bound, at leaſt to go the lengths we did; ſtill I am ſatisfied that the difference betwixt that and the preſent caſe, is ſufficient to warrant me in ſaying, that if we do not now, to our very utmoſt, aſſiſt and ſupport the King of *Pruſſia*, and the Electorate of *Hanover*, we offend againſt our own intereſt, and our own ſafety. So thoroughly I muſt be of the mind of the noble L——d, in a high office, who ſaid in the debate, that be the King's miniſters who they will, they are reſponſible in the higheſt degree to their country, firſt if they do not puſh the war in *America*, and next, if they do not lend all the aid they can, and give the utmoſt attention, to the affairs of the Continent, and eſpecially if they do not, by the moſt efficacious means, aſſiſt that great and magnanimous Prince, whom, thank God! we have now for our ally: a circumſtance which makes an important difference from the time when he was our enemy. I heartily wiſh it had never been ſo: but, as I ſaid before, it is in vain to look back only for the ſake of complaining. Now he is with us, let us not,

for

for God's ſake, loſe him, and endanger ourſelves, the liberties of *Europe*, and the Proteſtant religion, by acting improperly towards him.

I am, and I dare ſay every body who knows any thing of what paſſes muſt be, ſenſible under what prejudices many of the well-diſpoſed ſubjects of this country yet labour in their notions of the Continent, owing to the ſame things being now buzzed into their ears, that they have, on former occaſions, been accuſtomed to hear with great reſentment, and perhaps not without ſome reaſon of diſguſt, but which, if rightly conſidered, cannot now admit of the odious conſtruction they then bore, and that is yet endeavoured by ſome to be put upon them. And it is of great conſequence that theſe good miſtaken people ſhould be diſabuſed of their error, that they may not by a confuſion of language be miſled to diſtreſs, or cry out againſt, meaſures of Government neceſſary to be taken for the ſecurity of what is above all things dear to them, their Religion, Liberty, and Property. I wiſh any thing I could ſay had ſo happy a tendency.

The Continent, *Germany* and all the reſt of it, were words uſed ten years ago to inflame

the minds and irritate the paſſions of the people, and not without ſucceſs, whatever was the foundation for it; (I am ſorry if there was any); but they can only now catch the ignorant and unwary. Let us but conſider how we ſtood laſt war, and ſee what ſimilarity there is between the circumſtances of that and the preſent time.

It is well known that the laſt war, which we had the misfortune to have ſo deep a ſhare in, was a war which I do not ſay, becauſe I do not ſeriouſly think it, we had no concern in; for I am ſatisfied of no one thing more than of this, that we have a concern, and a material one, in whatever relates to the State of the Continent: but ſurely it was a war, the cauſes whereof were remote, that is, they did not directly ſtrike at any thing belonging to ourſelves, nor was the immediate purpoſe of it to contend, as the *Britiſh* nation, for any of our own poſſeſſions or rights, which the ſtruggle now is to wreſt from us. For my own part, I conſidered it as a ſtep of that ſcheme which has been carrying on in *France* ever ſince the days of *Lewis* the Thirteenth, whoſe great and wicked miniſter, *Richlieu*, laid the plan for univerſal monarchy; which has been purſued with unremitting

unremitting zeal in the two ſucceeding reigns, though perhaps diſguiſed in the ſhape of ambition for univerſal or general influence only, which, though more eaſily to be obtained, would not be leſs fatal to thoſe affected by it, and muſt be equally founded in the weakneſs, poverty, and dependence, of the other powers.

That ſome ſuch ſcheme as this has found a place in *French* councils, is evident from all their conduct for above a century paſt, in which no opportunity has been omitted by that court to bring it to bear——Thus the death of the Emperor *Charles* the Sixth, was laid hold of as a golden ſeaſon for doing ſomething to the purpoſe this way. The Houſe of *Auſtria* had for ages been the rival of the *French* monarchy, and was juſtly conſidered as the barrier of the *Germanic* conſtitution, and of the liberties of all *Europe*. It was therefore the natural enemy of *France*, and then was a time for humbling it. Accordingly, in breach of the moſt ſolemn engagements to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, that eſtabliſhment which the Emperor had, from a primary regard to his own family, but ſome regard to his neighbours too, made to ſecure the unity of his ſucceſſion,

and prevent the diſmembering of his dominions, and which all the other powers of *Europe*, as well as the *French* King, had by treaties become bound to ſupport, the moſt of them, and we in particular, for the ſake of the general peace, and to preſerve a poiſe to *Gallic* power: In breach, I ſay, of theſe engagements, *France* attacked the Queen of *Hungary*, after her father's death, ſet up a competitor to the Imperial throne, and a Pretender to the hereditary dominions, which were formally diſpoſed off by a treaty of partition.

Such being the cauſe, or rather the pretence, of the war, *Britain*, bound, as I hope ſhe always will be, by the faith of treaties, did interpoſe to aſſiſt the diſtreſſed Princeſs; and ſo far we did right, if we had kept within due bounds, or taken proper meaſures. I own, I fear we were chargeable with errors, but they were in our conduct, and not in the principle on which we acted; and I ſuſpect our ally was greatly to blame in her behaviour.

It certainly had been no worſe for her, and much better for us, if, inſtead of regarding the King of *Pruſſia*'s pretenſions to *Sileſia*, as an infraction of the Pragmatic Sanction,

tion, which he alſo was engaged to maintain (which never did to me appear a clear point, conſidering the foundations of his claim), his offer to aſſiſt the Queen in defending the reſt of her dominions had been accepted of on the terms of a ceſſion of what he demanded, and made good, as it would have quite altered the face of affairs, and, inſtead of a long and expenſive, as well as bloody, war, have made a very ſhort one.

It might have procured the Duke of *Lorrain*'s election to the imperial dignity, the thing his royal conſort had ſo much at heart, and at any rate would probably have added to his intereſt the votes of *Brandenburgh* and *Hanover*. For, had it not been for the King of *Pruſſia*'s coming on one ſide of our Sovereign's Electorate with an army, at the ſame time that the *French* penetrated to it through *Weſtphalia*, which forced the King to a ſhort neutrality in his electoral quality, his Majeſty would not have been under the temptation to that ſtep, which in thoſe circumſtances it became prudent, if not neceſſary, for him to take, and was always matter of regret, becauſe it expoſed his councils to obloquy, as if, as King of *Great Britain*, he had fought for the Queen of *Hungary*, and,

in

in oppoſition to the Emperor Duke of *Bavaria*, for whom as Elector he had been induced to vote; a ſeeming inconſiſtence, the very appearance of which was a conſideration ſufficient to make the well-affectionate to his Majeſty, wiſh the King of *Pruſſia* had not been provoked to act the part he did, by the Queen of *Hungary*'s refuſal of his offer, and perhaps going too far in ſchemes for reſenting his ſuppoſed Incroachment on the Pragmatick Sanction, if it be true, as has been ſaid, that a diviſion of his dominions was projected or concerted. However, here ſeems to have lain the original and fatal blunder which loſt the King of *Pruſſia*, and threw him into the *French* intereſt; to which unhappy union may be charged all the bad conſequences of the war, the heavieſt part of which fell on us, who were at beſt but auxiliaries.

But, after all, was that war like this? If it can in any degree be ſaid, that the vitals of this country were then waſted in a *German* quarrel, not immediately, though by conſequence affecting us, as it did the reſt of *Europe*, but which ſurely did not oblige us to pour forth our blood and treaſure as if we had been fighting *pro aris et focis*, for our

country

country at home, or our colonies abroad: Or if it be true, that, even ſo far as we were engaged to meddle on the Continent, we, or our ally, miſtook our meaſures, and thereby produced unnatural alliances againſt us; nay, let it be, that not only the Queen of *Hungary* coſt us much more than we ought at any rate to have beſtowed on her account—— and to make the thing as complete as the ſtrongeſt Anti-*German* could deſire, if it be alleged that we were made to defend *Hanover*, when expoſed, from the meaſures purſued by its Sovereign after his hands were let looſe, and the engagements of neutrality at an end——Be it all! and it is ſurely giving as much as can be aſked, and what is it to the preſent queſtion?

For is there a man in *Britain* who can deny that the preſent war is begun on true *Britiſh* principles, and theſe only; that the quarrel we are now engaged in with *France* is for *Britiſh* dominions;——for the trade, the glory, and the liberty of *Britain?*

We are not now fighting in a conteſt, whether a foreign power, a family upon the Continent, ſhall have its eſtates diſmembered or no; whether the Duke of *Bavaria*, or ſome other Princes, ſhall divide the *Auſtrian*

dominions, or who ſhall be raiſed to the ſupreme government of the Empire, and wear the imperial diadem:——events, I have already ſaid, we have a juſt concern in; but very different from our intereſt in the queſtions now to be decided by the ſword, which are not only, whether *France* ſhall overmatch all *Europe*, but, which comes home to us, whether *Britain* or ſhe ſhall be the firſt maritime power; whether the *French* ſhall have all the commerce, navigation, and naval ſtrength, we have now for a long time poſſeſſed, and we be reduced as low, in theſe reſpects, as they were even at the beginning of *Lewis* the Fourteenth's reign, who had hardly any Fleet (and his grandfather, *Henry* the Fourth, had none at all); ſome even pretend to ſay, that, at the beginning of laſt war, *France* did not afford forty ſhips of war of all ſizes;——an anecdote which, compared with what we now ſee, may almoſt make us tremble.

The queſtion now is, Whether we ſhall have any trade,---any colony; and have we not even had reaſon to ſay, it is whether we ſhall enjoy peace at home?---Such is the preſent war: and, under theſe circumſtances, who

can

can imagine there is any compariſon between it and the laſt.

But it may be ſaid, All this is true; and therefore let us exert a vigour proportioned to the value of *Britain* and *Britiſh America*: but what is our concern with *Pruſſia*, or with *Hanover*? That is going back to the old ſcheme, foreign connections, *German* quarrels, and ſo forth. And therefore, without intending in the leaſt to weaken what I have already ſaid as to the one, I ſhall ſuggeſt what occurs to me as to the other.

Theſe names, as has already been obſerved, have had their ſucceſs on former occaſions in raiſing rancor and ill blood; but I hope no thinking perſon will be led away with ſound: I even truſt, the multitude will not all, or always, be in the wrong. I have ſuppoſed, that poſſibly it was an error that made it become neceſſary for us, or that tempted us, to take ſo deep a ſhare in the laſt war; and that perhaps there were miſtakes in the management of our part: but I have alſo taken the liberty to deny, becauſe I never can allow, that we had no concern in that war, or that it had been proper for us to lie quite by, as matters then ſtood, merely becauſe the great object of the land-war was

the continent. Such a doctrine ſeems to me ſubverſive of the very fundamental ſyſtem of true *Britiſh* politics, and abſolutely inconſiſtent with the real intereſt of this country. Let us exerciſe judgment, as to the time and circumſtances in which it is proper for us to meddle in the affairs of the continent; and when we do it, let us deal out our aſſiſtance with juſt œconomy. Why not? But that we ſhould never meddle, is a poſition appears to me to be radically wrong. Far leſs can I be of opinion, that we ſhould not at preſent take a concern in the affairs of *Germany*. For if we had any intereſt at all in the laſt war, as I have endeavoured to ſhew was the caſe, ſure I am, we have every intereſt, every call, and every obligation, that poſſibly we can have, now to interfere on the continent. We are, and give me leave to ſay we ought to conſider ourſelves rather as principals, than as mere auxiliaries, in the preſent war upon the continent: and, as the great perſonage ſaid, whoever are the miniſtry, it will be at their higheſt peril, if they neglect or forbear to give the moſt effectual aſſiſtance we can, in our preſent ſituation, which indeed I am ſorry is no better, to the King of *Pruſſia*, and Electorate of *Hanover*:

and

and I ſhall ſubmit the reaſons, which move me to be of this opinion.

Firſt of all then, I cannot help mentioning, what always had great weight with me in this matter; I mean, the general intereſt and concern, which, independent of all particular connections, we have in the preſervation of the King of *Pruſſia*, and Electorate of *Hanover*, as powers that at preſent make ſome figure in the *European* ſyſtem, and, I will add, as *proteſtant* powers; as I hope every good proteſtant will think. This is a circumſtance of ſome moment.

When I ſpeak of our concern in the preſervation of any foreign power or ſtate, it is eaſy to perceive I have reference to the Ballance of Power: a term that has been often toſſed about in political diſputes; but a thing which, in my own mind, I am, and I hope moſt people now are, thoroughly convinced has a real exiſtence, and is by no means an empty name or an idle thing; and not the leſs, that it may not poſſibly be always eaſy with preciſion to define what it is, or where it lies. And therefore, however much it may have been made a ſtalking-horſe of by one, and a butt to the raillery of another party, and perhaps alternately of the ſame perſons;

I ſcruple not to give it that place in my argument, which to me it appears, upon good principles, to merit.

One thing I may take the liberty to remind of; a matter of fact, too true to be denied, and too ſerious to be neglected; That while we in this country have at different times, and with various ſucceſs, been employed, ſome to eſtabliſh, and others to deſtroy, the notion of a ballance of power in *Europe*, as ideal or imaginary, there is one court, where there never has been any diſſenſion, as to the reality of its exiſtence; and in the councils and ſchemes of which it has always been a great object. While we have endeavoured, in the courſe of different adminiſtrations, to invalidate or expoſe the name, every adminiſtration in *France* has laboured what they could, by art and power, to deſtroy the thing.

French policy has not wanted the juſteſt notions of this ballance. While amongſt us it has not failed to be repreſented as a mere bugbear ſet up by miniſters to ſerve jobbs, a ſucceſſion of miniſters in *France*, of whoſe abilities *Europe* bears ſad marks, has given ample proofs how much they conſidered it as an obſtruction to their deſigns; inſomuch that

that they have neglected nothing to overcome the obſtacle. To pull down this bulwark of liberty, this barrier of territory, has every thing, that invention could deviſe, and fraud or force uſe, been employed with ceaſeleſs aſſiduity. The deſtruction of the ballance of power in *Europe*, by aggrandizing *France* at the coſt of every other country and ſtate, has been the chief ſcope of an uniform plan of *French* government: and *Britain*—*Britain*, which, without boaſting, we may, and with gratitude to Heaven we ought to ſay has, in many valuable reſpects, been the Queen of the modern world, —is the great, tho' (thank God!) from her natural ſtrength, ſhe is even in the project reſerved to be the laſt, ſacrifice to *Gallic* ambition.

To deſtroy us, and cut us off from being a nation, is the great mark, by reducing us to ſubjection to the Grand Monarque, or at leaſt making little better than a blank of the place we now fill in *Europe*, by diveſting us of our power and influence: for, monſtrous and incredible as it may ſeem, and vain as all notions of erecting an univerſal Empire, whether formed by a *Philip* of *Macedon*, an *Alexander* the *Great*, or a *Charles* the

Vth

Vth of *Germany*, all of whom were in ſome meaſure the bubbles of that impracticable deſign, may be ſuppoſed; I little doubt, and, were it neceſſary, I think it could be ſhewn, that *Frenchmen* have been bold enough to hatch, and *French* kings, or miniſters, which is the ſame thing, wicked enough to adopt, the romantic ſcheme; and that the conqueſt of *Britain* is, as well it may, a principal part of it.

There is nothing more common in the mouths of the people of this country, even the loweſt of them, than expreſſions of hatred and averſion to the *French*. And tho' I ſhall very readily admit the juſtneſs of the obſervation, that general or national prejudices are improper; yet I believe the truth of the remark depends more upon the miſapplication than the groundleſneſs of thoſe prejudices, which, it is probable, take their riſe from general or national characters: for tho' perhaps it is true, and I am as ſenſible of it as any can be, that it is wrong to apply the general character, which we have of a nation, or the prejudices thence ariſing, to individuals of that country, as they will often be found to be moſt improper; yet I am convinced there is a great reality in the thing itſelf,

itſelf, and perhaps not ſo very great a miſtake in the notions that prevail of general national characters, and that both with reſpect to morals and politics, which are things very near akin to one another.

And therefore, however much I ſhould be againſt treating a private *Frenchman* upon the foot of any general or national prejudice I have againſt his country, yet I have no inclination to diſcountenance, or eradicate out of the minds of *Engliſhmen*, the prejudice itſelf. I don't expect that every one that entertains it can give a rational or philoſophical account why he does do it: that is not to be imagined, conſidering how we all imbibe prejudices, and ſuck in opinions, that may be juſt enough in themſelves, but were never examined by us; which makes them deſerve no better name than that of prejudices, tho' in themſelves they may be very well founded. Yet I believe the notion is but too juſt, which we have of the *French*, in what may be called a *moro-political* view, as the perfidious enemies of this country: a character that lays a very good foundation for any averſion we bear to them; and therefore, inſtead of being offended with it, I rather regret, that in ſpite of our averſion

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to the country, we ſhould be ſo fond of its faſhions and cuſtoms; the importation of which is ſo great an article of our commerce with *France*, and the cultivation thereof ſo dangerous a preparative to a corruption of manners, which may in time deſtroy the diſtinction that, I hope, yet remains between the *French* and us in that reſpect.

It were rather to be wiſhed, that this averſion had a greater effect on our public and national conduct towards the *French*; the want of which can hardly be aſcribed to any other reaſon, than that general inattention to public affairs, which has place amongſt us; all regard to the public being joſtled out by undue reſpect to private intereſt, or that diſſipation and diſſoluteneſs of manners that ſo remarkably prevails.

We cry out againſt the *French*, often we know not why: but there is a good reaſon for it, if it were attended to, which ought to make us do more, tho' we would ſpeak leſs. The true and the juſt cauſe of that proper anti-gallican ſpirit, which ought to to be cheriſhed in the breaſt of every *Engliſhman*, lies in the character of the *French* nation itſelf, and the point of view they ſtand in with reſpect to us: than which, I

know

know not a more ſerious or intereſting ſubject of reflection, eſpecially to our governors: for tho' it may be the amuſement of others, it is the duty of thoſe, who have any ſhare in public management, to ſtudy our relations with other countries; and not only thoſe, whoſe intereſts are connected with our own, but eſpecially thoſe, whoſe intereſts are oppoſite to ours; which is the known and avowed caſe as to *France*.

There is too good evidence of ſuch a repugnancy of intereſt, and enmity to our happineſs as a nation, as ſurely gives no reaſon to abate our averſion, and ought, if not to produce in us a reciprocation of hatred, at leaſt to excite us to a firmneſs and conſtancy of conduct, neceſſary to defeat or repel the miſchievous attempts of that tyranny and ambition, which ſo juſtly characterizes their government. Such muſt become the genius of this nation, if we hope to ſubſiſt. Would to God we ſaw the beginning of ſo wiſe and nervous a ſyſtem, that would yet give ſtability and glory to a tottering ſtate! Then might we hope to ſee ourſelves become an overmatch for the all-graſping and aſpiring monarchy of *France*.

The ſame evidence that ſhews how oppoſite the intereſt of *France*, or what is purſued by her as her intereſt, is to ours, is alſo inconteſtible proof of what importance a proper attention to the ballance of power is: and the evidence is, their general plan, which is too manifeſt and viſible to be doubted or denied.

It is well known, what pains *Colbert* took to lay a foundation for raiſing the commerce and maritime power of *France:* but this was but one part of the grand ſyſtem formed by *Richlieu*, and foſtered by his diſciple *Mazarin*, and which has throve wonderfully well ever ſince. One great advantage it has had, that it has not been proſecuted by fits and ſtarts: it is an object they never loſe ſight of; it is the conſtant ſcheme, the very ſyſtem of their government; and ſyſtematical governments, like what has been wiſely obſerved of adminiſtrations of that kind, are moſt likely to compaſs whatever is propoſed as the end in view. We talk of this; but, alas! we don't think of it. We often allude to it, and take it for granted, that the government of *France* now does, and has for a great while paſt, purſued a ſcheme of power to themſelves, inconſiſtent with the liberties

of

of *Europe*, but the fact, tho' it is believed, makes a light impreſſion upon us.

I confeſs one could hardly credit ſo ſurpriſing a ſtory, as we have been told by ſome, that there has lain in the *French* King's cabinet, now of a great while, a digeſted ſyſtem and plan of operations, which is as conſtantly in view, as regularly conſulted, and ſteadily followed, as the plan of any private gentleman's policy for beautifying and improving a country ſeat: and yet, upon reflection, it will appear to be the beſt ſolution of the conduct of the *French* nation; for it is impoſſible that ſuch a train of actions, as has been ſeen in a long period of time, could have happened, without we ſuppoſe not only an aim at univerſal dominion of ſome ſort or other, but alſo believe they act upon ſome general plan, which they are ſtriving to execute by degrees, as the courſe of things gives them opportunity.

Accordingly, a late writer * has not only ſaid there is ſuch a plan, but has ventured to exhibit it to the public from good authority: and, upon my word, I think we are obliged to him, as it ſeems to be a moſt efficacious

* See *Great Britain's true Syſtem.*

ſternutatory to rouze the inhabitants of this iſland, from the higheſt to the loweſt, out of their lethargy.

This ſyſtem, we may preſume, *French* policy never intended ſhould be public. And one would naturally think, that the diſcovery of it ſhould have been a pearl of great price to this country in particular, not only on account of our own intereſt, but as we have been, and I hope will yet be, the great pillar of human liberty. But ſo it is (as that author has told us), it was divulged in a treatiſe ſaid to be wrote by a gentlemen bred under *Colbert*, and given to *Lewis* XIV. in manuſcript; but that ſome-how or other came to be publiſhed in the year 1664, which, and no wonder, brought its author under diſgrace, and made him actually to be ſent to the *Baſtille*, and afterwards baniſhed, for ſuffering the matter to become public: an anecdote we are, it ſeems, indebted for to a writer of authority of our own country in the year 1680, who mentions the thing in a treatiſe, intituled, *Britannia Languens*.

The particulars of this ſyſtem or plan are truly amazing; and they merit not only to be read, but ruminated upon, by every *Britiſh* man, who knows the value of his birthright.

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The plan wiſely propoſes, as the foundation of wealth, a number of uſeful ſubjects; and, for providing what is neceſſary for their ſupport, a great regard to agriculture.—Then great care is to be taken to ſtock the country with artificers and handicrafts, to manufacture the growth of the country (which naturally increaſes the quantity of its productions), not only for home conſumption, but for export.—This is trade.—Then there muſt be merchants to carry on this trade.—Theſe, therefore, are to be much encouraged.—Next, out of commerce a fleet is to be raiſed, which commerce will always ſupport as well as produce: and it will not only protect the commerce out of which it ariſes, but it will alſo weaken the Maritime Powers, by obliging them alſo to keep great fleets for protecting their trade. And a method is laid down for employing this *French* fleet, and for creating work for thoſe of the maritime ſtates.—So much for trade and maritime power.

The ſyſtem next proceeds to project the increaſe of dominion; and plans out adding to *France* all the Low Countries, which would make it maſter of the north ſeas.—It would be convenient, it ſays, to have

Straſburgh, to keep *Germany* quiet — There is need of *Franche Comté*, to lay reſtraints upon the *Switzers* — *Milan* is neceſſary, in reſpect of *Italy* — *Genoa*, to make the *French* King maſter of the *Mediterranean Sea*. — An eye is caſt to *Sicily*, as important for the *Levant* and *Italian* trade. — *Portugal* is looked upon as a perpetual inſtrument for weakening *Spain*. — *Venice* and *Italy* are to be reduced to the *French* intentions by downright force. — The Pope's reſpect is ſuppoſed to be ſecured, becauſe of the county of *Avignon*. — *Holland*, it is ſaid, will keep themſelves to our (the *French*) alliances, as much as poſſibly they may: they are rich: it is expedient the King ſhould interpoſe in their affairs; and that ſome diviſions be ſown amongſt them. — The *Switzers* are mercenary, and will always ſerve the King for his money. — *Denmark*, ſays the projector, is a ſmall ſtate: meaning, its buſineſs would be eaſily done. — The *Swedes*, it was expected, would not break from the intereſt of *France*. — Mark what follows. "We ought to "conſider all the inſtruments, which for "our money we may make uſe of, to divert "the forces of *England* and *Holland*, when "his majeſty makes any enterprize that "pleaſes

" pleaſes them not."—— The friendſhip of *Turkey*, it is ſaid, is very good for *France*. —— And laſt of all, which is indeed the cap-ſtone, the ſcheme ſpeaks of *England*, as eaſy to be conquered, when the other points ſhould be carried by *France*; for that a war with *France* would ruin her: — and lays it down as a maxim, that no peace ſhould be made with *England*, but upon conditions of the greateſt advantage to *France*. ——And the league with *Holland* ſhould be renewed, and the *Dutch* made to believe, that *France* ſhould give them all the trade ſtill, becauſe they have the knowlege of it, and are proper for it: but that the *French*, as is to be ſuggeſted, have no inclination that way; and neither knowlege nor inclination can be forced. They muſt be told, they are come to the happy time for advancing their affairs, and ruining their competitors (the *Engliſh*) in the ſovereignty of the northern ſeas.

Theſe are the great out-lines of this grand ſyſtem of *France*. But alas! one half is not yet told. The ſcheme is indeed big with terror: but what ſhall we ſay, when we look at the counterpart, and compare events with the project, and conſider how much

much of this vaſtly comprehenſive and dangerous ſcheme is already executed? How may we be alarmed, when we hear that it is advanced more than half-way? Yet I doubt, mortifying as it is, we ſhall find it is not wide of the mark to ſay ſo.

It is a truth that *Britain* knows, by ſad experience, to what an amazing height the commerce and naval power of *France*, thoſe inſeparable companions, have arrived; which is the firſt part of the ſcheme. How ſucceſsful the wiſe and ſkilful meaſures purſued for attaining that great end have been, their equality with us at ſea, and the decline of our trade in ſome of its moſt material branches, teach us.

Agriculture, I believe, has done pretty well. But what a rapid progreſs have not arts and manufactures of all ſorts made in *France*, even the moſt ſtaple manufactures of *England*? In ſpite of all diſadvantages, in point of wool, they have reared a manufacture of cloth that rivals ours; and, without the climate of *Italy*, they have, by uncommon induſtry in propagating the mulberry, tranſplanted the growth of ſilk into the ſouthern parts of *France*, where it is now become a natural production.---And indeed

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it is hard to ſay, what with art added to nature they may not do, as to raiſing a ſpecies of ſheep that will equal *England* in wool, ſo as even to make them independent of the counterband trade of woolling they now carry on with us, very much to our own detriment.

It is almoſt incredible how, in ſo ſhort a time, they have extended their trade to every quarter of the globe, the *Levant*, *Africa*, *America*, *Eaſt* and *Weſt Indies*. ------ For inſtance, it is computed, it ſeems, that inſtead of thirty, they have, ſince 1720, come up to three hundred (a very material addition of a cypher) ſail of ſhips annually employed in the *American* trade from *Bourdeaux*:——they have quadrupled the ſugar trade, while we have not near doubled it;--- and their fur trade is a third more conſiderable than ours. —— In proportion to the extent of their commerce is the ſtrength of the *French* navy, as naturally might be expected.

But have not the other parts of the ſyſtem advanced with almoſt an equal pace? If we take a ſurvey of the dominions of *France*, we ſhall find that their deſires have not only been fulfilled, but their wiſhes in ſome in-

ſtances exceeded. *France* has got a ſlice of country at almoſt every general peace, down from the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* in 1688, to that concluded at the ſame place in 1748. Are the Low Countries a deſirable morſel, ſaid the ſyſtem? Has not *France* got ſome large diſtricts of them, and ſeveral cities and towns of great importance, ſuch as *Namur*, *Charle-Roi*, *Aeth*, *Douay*, *Tournay*, *Liſle*, and others;——and they were in poſſeſſion of the whole country at the end of laſt war, which indeed coſt them time, labour, money, and men; but now we ſee a ſtranger thing! when we behold the gates of *Bruges* and *Oſtend* opened to *French* garriſons, and the Empreſs Queen, their Sovereign, not only admitting them as allies, but peaceably yielding to her new confederate a government, which ſhe may find not ſo eaſy to recover from the hands it is got into.

Was *Straſburgh* wanted? *France* has got it, and all the country of which it is the capital, *Alſace*, the moſt unhappy acceſſion which could be in regard of the Empire, the very bowels of which are laid open by this diſmemberment, and a blow given to the proteſtant religion that was eſtabliſhed at *Straſburgh*; and, not to leſſen this misfortune,

tune, *Lorrain* is now perpetually annexed to the kingdom of *France*.

Franche Comté the *French* got, according to cuſtom, by the peace of *Nimeguen*, at the expence of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. As to *Milan*, it is hard to ſay, if matters remain as at preſent, how long it may be before they recover the poſſeſſion they had in it at the time of *Francis* the Firſt. The Empreſs's voluntarily giving away her right ear, will not hinder them, if they are able, from taking the left alſo.——*Genoa*, it is true, is yet its own ſovereign; but the laſt war ſhewed, and I fear this has already taught us, how great and how valuable to *France* is her influence over that little maritime ſtate, by which ſhe procures ſo convenient ſupplies of ſailors to her own navy: and it looks as if the *French* had a good chance to get *Corſica* to themſelves, which with *Minorca*, if they are able, or get leave to keep it, will give them the dominion of the *Mediterranean* ſeas.

The face of *Italy* has much changed ſince this ſtrange ſyſtem was formed; and what power *France* has got there by the ſettlements of younger branches of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, does, I fear, more than anſwer the

purpoſe of having *Sicily* to themſelves, as wiſhed for, and ballance the friendſhip we preſerve with the court of *Portugal*, or the indifference that *Venice* ſhows.

As to the northern powers, we ſee what influence *French* gold has there.——But for *Holland*, could a prophet have more exactly foretold the event projected by this ſcheme? —It were expedient, does it ſay, that the King interpoſed in their affairs, and that ſome diviſions were ſown among them.—— The expediency of this meaſure has been proved by the experiment; for *Holland* is not any more to us, what ſhe formerly was, the faithful friend and ally of *Great Britain*. And, that nothing might be wanting to favour the deſigns of *France*, the pacific turn, which the *Ottoman Porte* has of late years aſſumed, ſeems at preſent to be rather an advantage than a loſs; becauſe, tho' it has left the natural enemies of *France* in poſſeſſion of an unuſual quiet, they are, by that very circumſtance, permitted to join their arms with thoſe of *France*, however unnatural the conjunction or mad the combination is which is effected by this new, and hitherto unheard of, alliance.

Having

Having thus taken a view of this *French* ſcheme, and of what is much more material, and ſurely very terrible, the progreſs of its accompliſhment; may we not, with the deepeſt feelings, recall to mind what is the concluſion, and, we may ſay, the very *butt* of the ſyſtem—"*England* is to be conquered:" and, after certain points gained, which have been projected as to other countries, ſo many of which we ſee are already brought to paſs, it is expected that the conqueſt would be eaſy; and that the mortal ſtroke could be given by a war with *France*, which it is hoped would ruin *England*: And the reſolution is, that no peace is to be made with *England*, but upon conditions of the greateſt advantage to *France* — A reſolution, which, we ſee, is the very ſpring of *French* councils: and there is not the ſmalleſt proſpect of its being departed from, unleſs from a defect of power to carry it into execution; of which the hopes at preſent are, alas! but diſtant.

The effect of one war, and another, with *France*, we have felt ſince this ſyſtem was formed; and the lateſt is too good a proof how well the *Frenchman* could gueſs: for how near to ruin has it not brought us? But

if

if one or even two wars have not done the buſineſs, God knows what a third may do; and that we are now engaged in.

Did we obtain a peace when ſued for? No: ſay rather a deceitful truce; and the conditions of it of ſuch a nature as I chooſe not to mention with, nor will I without, their proper name: but this we may depend upon, if experience can convince us of any thing, that not the *ſemblance* of peace need we expect from *France*, but on the worſt conditions for us that they can give, or that we will accept of.— And a ſolid and laſting peace I as much look for as the junction of the *Poles*, while *France* continues as ſhe is: and if ſhe becomes yet more powerful, there will be ſtill leſs chance to ſee it.

Is all this ſo (and that it is, I appeal to inflexible truth), and will any man ſay, that the ballance of power is a mere ideal or imaginary thing? or will any *Engliſhman* ſay, that *Britain* is not highly intereſted in the preſervation of it? Is the language with reſpect to us, the ſame that was uſed of old by that antient haughty ſtate, once the miſtreſs of the world, *delenda eſt Carthago*, or no peace for *England?* Nay, are they in hopes of our deſtruction? hardly mixed with

with doubts of perfecting it, after the fate of other ſtates has paved the way to it? And can *England* be indifferent to what *France* does, or what is done to any other country? Or can it be denied, that this ſame ballance of power, on which our own preſervation ſo much depends, is endangered by every commotion that *French* machinations, or arms, are able to raiſe in *Europe?* Is the great aim of *France* to deſtroy the ballance of power, and ſhould not all the reſt of *Europe* unite to ſuſtain and preſerve it?

It is no leſs ground for wonder, than matter of regret, that ſo many of the *European* ſtates are empoiſoned by *French* influence to go counter to their own evident intereſt, and tempted or ſeduced, as it were, to lay hands on themſelves, and become the inſtruments of their own death; which will as ſurely be the iſſue of theſe lingering diſtempers, the ſeeds whereof are ſent from *Verſailles*, as of the moſt acute or violent diſeaſe.

But whatever others are, or whatever they do, we muſt, and will, if we are ourſelves, not only not neglect, but, of all others, regard as the moſt important, that very object, the Ballance of Power.

It is too clear not to be ſeen, how great danger this country is in from the ambitious views of *France*; which are ſo much the more terrible and alarming, ſince, as has been obſerved, they are purſued in a ſyſtematical way: nor is it, in my humble apprehenſion, leſs demonſtrable, how miſguided and erroneous a notion that is, which, I don't know how, has crept into the minds of our people, and only of later years, as I ſhall by and by take notice, That *Britain* can, with ſafety to herſelf, be wrapped up in her own natural and internal ſtrength, however great, or be detached from every other part of the world; and particularly that ſhe can, without hazard, loſe or renounce all connections with the continent.

It is a doctrine ſo oppoſite to any idea I can form of the true ſyſtem of *Engliſh* policy, that I look upon it as little leſs than a melancholy prelude of our ruin; and cannot diſſemble my fears, that it is a weed of foreign importation, ſown by the grand enemy, who is always on the watch, and miſſes no opportunity of doing what tends to promote the great end they have in view; and, among other means, but too ſucceſsfully uſes this of diſſeminating opinions contrary to

the true intereſts of thoſe who embrace them.

Of this there are not wanting inſtances, both at home and abroad, worthy enough to be attended to, leſt we ſhould imbibe the poiſon.——We ſee, in our next neighbouring country, how effectually *French* deceit, or ſomething elſe, hath blinded a people once on a day not remarkable for being ſhort-ſighted to their own intereſts, and thereby carried them off from their natural attachment and connection with us, to the great and unſpeakable detriment of the common cauſe.

That ſuch an opinion, however, has got footing in this country, is certainly too obvious to be doubted and yet how ſo pernicious a maxim could find a way into the breaſt of any well-diſpoſed man, capable to exerciſe the ſlighteſt reflexion upon the preſent ſtate of *Europe*, or compare it with paſt events, is to me, I own, a myſtery.

Let us but think for a moment. Is the conqueſt of other places, the ruin of other countries, laid down as the great, the neceſſary, and indeed the ſure means of vanquiſhing *England?* and have we no intereſt or concern in what paſſes in the world around

us? Does it import us nothing, whether *Germany* be over-run, and diſmembered, and great acceſſions made to the *French* territories? Branches of the Houſe of *Bourbon* placed as a ſort of *French* Viceroys, under the title of Sovereigns, of other, and ſome of them the moſt powerful, Kingdoms in *Europe?* Is it a matter of ſmall moment to us, that our ſiſter maritime power *Holland* be deſtroyed; or, which is much the ſame thing, be drawn off from the inſeparable connection ſhe ought to have with us, and that union, ſo eſſential to our mutual ſecurity; or that ſhe become a downright province of *France*, retaining nothing but the form of her government, diveſted of her power, and ſtript of her barrier? The neceſſary conſequence of which is, that ſhe muſt be under abſolute *French* ſway, and ſubject to the nod of *French* will; as we have formerly ſeen, now do, and always muſt ſee, when *France* is maſter of the keys of their country.

For goodneſs ſake, where is the difference betwixt theſe inſtances of an older date, that have been mentioned, and others, that do now occur! Is it leſs our buſineſs now to withſtand the growing power of *France* where

where-ever the ſtorm of her Thunder breaks; becauſe ſhe has in a courſe of ſixty or ſeventy years made ſuch vaſt havock in *Europe*; laying waſte kingdoms and countries at her pleaſure? Is there nothing left for us, but to look on till the devaſtation ſeize ourſelves? God forbid!

What then is the meaning of the modern cry, No *German* connections, no buſineſs with the Continent, no concern with *Pruſſia* or *Hanover*? Is the power of *France* already ſo much ſwoln, and muſt it yet riſe higher? Has ſhe added *Alſace* and *Lorrain* to her dominions, which was like cutting off the ſkirts of *Germany*, and muſt ſhe now penetrate to the very heart of the Empire? Has ſhe diſmantled the *Low Countries*, and got poſſeſſion of a great part of *Flanders* by former wars? Nay, are not only the gates of the barrier, the defence of which, of old and of late, coſt ſo much blood and treaſure, but the very ſea-port towns of the *Netherlands* open to her, without ſtroke of the ſword; and *Holland* itſelf at her command? And are we to ſleep? Are *Pruſſia* and *Hanover* to be the portion of this war? And what ſhall be the next deſtined victim to the Great Monarque's ambition? Where ſhall *England*

then be? Shall we alone remain unmoved? Does *France* think that is impoſſible; and will we yet amuſe ourſelves with a fond conceit of our own impregnable city? An opinion which, at leaſt, might have been ſtaggered by our late alarms!

The things that I have mentioned are the outworks: the *French* themſelves conſider them as ſuch. They laid their account, that they muſt firſt be done, in order to make *England* an eaſy prey: and indeed it will be too much ſo, when once the ballance of power is overthrown. If *France* comes to have a greater force than all *Europe* beſide, we muſt yield our necks to the ignominious yoke. Ought not we then to ſtand on our defence, when the knife is at our throat; and, if poſſible, ſtem the tide, and repell this inundation, that muſt ſooner or later, if not reſiſted, overwhelm us, after it has, in our helpleſs ſight, ſwallowed up our friends and neighbours?

I would not once mention the notion that has long prevailed, and which I approve of in a proper limited ſenſe; but doubt has had too great influence to miſlead well-meaning people. The ſea, it has been conſtantly cried out, is our bulwark. We are entrenched with water; and, if we keep our force on

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that element, no matter what becomes of the Continent. I forbear, I ſay, ſo much as to mention this; becauſe I hold it to be exploded. Late experience having taught us the vanity of that defence, if truſted to alone.

That might do very well when *France* had no naval ſtrength at all; hardly a tranſport, and never a ſhip of war to guard an embarkation of forces; and, I might add, not a place in her poſſeſſion, from which to ſend them to invade us; as was, in a great meaſure, the caſe, while we retained *Dunkirk*, that conſtant ſource of terror to us now. But when we ſee ſuch armaments as have of later years appeared deſtined for invading this country, and all but——accompliſhing the deſign; our very deliverance owing to the immediate interpoſition of Providence; old maxims, as to our wooden walls, abate their ſtrength, with change of circumſtances, which overcomes opinions, as length of time deſtroys things.——And were we but to ſuppoſe *Oſtend* now to be transferred to the *French*, how much more precarious would our ſafety be thereby rendered?

Perhaps,

Perhaps, indeed, as one extreme commonly ſucceeds another, we are now apt to go too far the other way: for the *French* king ſeems, at preſent, to have no more to do but to march a regiment or two to the coaſt of *Normandy*, or aſſemble a parcel of fiſhing boats upon the oppoſite ſide of the Channel, and preſently we are in a hubbub! Something like a ſaying I once heard a great man repeat, of the time when the Court of *Verſailles* needed only to white-waſh *St. Germains*, and *England* was in terror: but, at leaſt, I take it to be now the general opinion, that the ſea, and the fleet of *Great Britain*, great and ſtrong as it is, is not of itſelf an abſolute ſecurity.

It is therefore needleſs to enlarge on this worn-out topic: I ſhall only make this one obſervation, applicable to it——That in proportion as the territories of *France* enlarge, its commerce muſt increaſe, and, of courſe, its naval power grow. This we ſee by experience; and herein appears the unity of their ſcheme, which connects all the different parts of it together. Nor need I add, that every addition that the maritime ſtrength of *France* receives, muſt, in the nature of the thing, be not only a real diminution of ours,

but

but is a virtual abatement of its efficacy, conſidered as a defence to our country: the ſecurity whereof depends on our ſuperiority at ſea to any other nation, that is diſpoſed to diſturb our tranquility; which we are all ſenſible is the invariable character of *France*.

Hence it becomes neceſſary to conſult other meaſures for our own ſafety. I don't ſay, but it is a good thing, a wiſe and juſt precaution, to form a proper militia, for our internal defence; that we may not on any emergency be reduced to the ignoble neceſſity of calling foreign troops into our bowels; or of being diſtreſſed for want of ſuch a mercenary, and I do admit dangerous, aſſiſtance.

But even that will not be found ſufficient. We muſt look about us, and prevent miſchief while at a diſtance. We muſt not wait for the enemy's coming to the door; but meet him, while yet a great way off: for we may talk what we will, but it's the *power* of *France* that is the enemy we have to dread: it is that therefore we muſt check. Our ſecurity cannot lie wholly in our own ability to defend ourſelves either by natural, or artificial, and acquired ſtrength. It conſiſts more in the incapacity of *France* to diſtreſs or annoy us; and that again depends on the ſucceſs

ceſs of her ambitious ſchemes; which we muſt conſider as aiming at us ultimately where-ever the preſent ſcene of execution may be.

This one thing we may be ſure of; That *England* is never out of their eye; and even we who now live, may, but our poſterity muſt, feel, that it is a deadly miſtake in *Britiſh* policy, if we perſuade ourſelves, that, unleſs the attack is directly levelled againſt us, we are not concerned where the ſound of war is heard.

Pruſſia, *Hanover*, *Holland*, or any other ſtate in *Europe*; ſome perhaps are more material, others leſs; but all are of ſome and even a great degree of conſequence.

Now we hear theſe are attacked by *France*. Suppoſe we were next to hear of their being conquered: And does not that affect us? As eaſily would I believe, if I lived at *Newcaſtle*, and heard *Berwick* was in poſſeſſion of an enemy, that I was nevertheleſs in no hazard.

No doubt *France* would gladly conquer any of thoſe countries, or any other that they have not already, ſome way or other, got under their influence: But is it only for the ſake of the addition that ſuch conqueſt would make to its territories, that *France* would wiſh to be

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in poſſeſſion of them? Will they ſtop there? No.—This thing, and t'other, are but ſteps; *Power*, *Univerſal Power*, is their view; to be, if not the only, at leaſt the great, the ſupreme power, that ſhall give law to *Europe*, is what they aſpire at; to be able to ſend her reſcripts from *Verſailles*, and her edicts to the ends of the world: in ſhort, to deſtroy the independency of other ſtates, to leſſen their figure, and deprive them of their liberty, and, above all, to cruſh *England*, is the ſcheme; for we are the great eyeſore, as a poet of our own long ago expreſſed it, with great ſtrength and beauty, when he ſaid,

Theſe contending kingdoms, England *and* France,
Whoſe very ſhores look pale
With envy of each other's happineſs.

To us, therefore, it is a matter of the laſt importance how quick the advances are to this ſummit of unruly ambition.

Europe is a ſyſtem, one great body conſtructed of different parts and members, which make an entire whole; and what preſerves the ſyſtem, ſuſtains its general figure, and maintains its integrity, is nothing but the equilibre of power; which depends not on one branch, or another, but on the

general conſtitution, and relation the parts have to one another, and all together. This is the *Ballance of Power*; which, tho' a figurative term, is a juſt and ſignificant expreſſion.

What gravity or attraction, we are told, is to the ſyſtem of the univerſe, *that* the ballance of power is to *Europe*: a thing we cannot juſt point out to ocular inſpection, and ſee or handle; but which is as real in its exiſtence, and as ſenſible in its effects, as the weight is in ſcales. And if we ſuffer this ballance to be deſtroyed, or overturned in any remarkable degree, we endanger the whole ſyſtem, and, by conſequence, the ſafety of every particular branch of it: much more if we allow the power to go all into one hand; which is what the ambition of *France* graſps at, that ſhe may thereby become the abſolute miſtreſs of *Europe*.

It is the happineſs of later ages, that, by a wiſe providential diſtribution of power, and diviſion of dominion, there is eſtabliſhed a general independence (that great patron of liberty) in this quarter of the globe; which, for that reaſon chiefly, if not only, is eſteemed the beſt and happieſt part of the world, in ſpite of its inferiority to other climates, where

where nature is more bountiful in its fineſt productions; of which, however, by the engine of Commerce, that other intimate friend of liberty, we have enough not to feel our own natural indigence. And they that machinate and contrive to overturn that, I will call it, *divine* conſtitution, fight againſt God himſelf, and are the malignant enemies of mankind.

Yet it is no calumny to ſay, that ſuch has been the deviliſh ſpirit of all the princes or miniſters that have governed in *France* ſince the houſe of *Valois* was ſucceeded by that of *Bourbon*, one inſtance only excepted; I mean, the firſt King of the laſt-mentioned family, that great and good prince *Henry* the IVth, who came to the crown a Proteſtant, and died ſo, as is recorded to his immortal honour, with the moſt ſacred notions of the ballance of power in *Europe*, and the neceſſity of preſerving it; and was big with a ſcheme for ſettling it upon a firm and ſolid baſis, when the hands of an infamous aſſaſſin deprived him of his life, and the world of a bleſſing; at once murdering a King, and extinguiſhing the laſt ſparks of the love of liberty, public juſtice, and national faith, that ever dwelt in *French* blood royal; his ſucceſſors,

down to this day, having either uſed others as the inſtruments of their own inclination, or been themſelves the tools of able but abandoned ſervants, to deſtroy that ballance which is the beſt cement of ſociety, and the ſureſt band of human happineſs.

We ſhould be perfectly ſatisfied of this, by reflecting on the hiſtory of *France*, from the period of *Lewis* the XIIIth's acceſſion; which is little elſe than the hiſtory of one continued war againſt Liberty and the Proteſtant religion. He ſucceeded his father, the good King *Henry* the IVth; and he, or rather his miniſter, began the work, in which it is evident he proceeded on a general ſcheme. The deſtruction of the Proteſtants, who were at that time a very conſiderable part of the kingdom, and humbling the Nobility and Princes of the blood, who had hitherto enjoyed great power, and been able, by a proper poize againſt the power of the crown, to preſerve their own and their country's liberty (*France* being before that time little different from ourſelves in conſtitution and government) was one great object: reducing the houſe of *Auſtria*, then the known rival of the *Gallic* monarchy, was another: and in both theſe *Richlieu* ſucceeded to a

miracle;

miracle; for in this one reign the liberty of *France* was abſolutely overthrown, and deſpotiſm eſtabliſhed, not more to their own misfortune than the terror and confuſion of all Chriſtendom, which has ſenſibly felt the fatal effects of that grievous change in their internal ſyſtem, as has been judiciouſly remarked in ſpeculation, and ſadly confirmed by experience: ſo true it is, that one nation cannot undergo any remarkable change in its ſtate without affecting the beſt concerns of thoſe around them. And, at the ſame time that this overturn was made at home, the arms of *France* brought the Emperor and *Spain*, which was at that time governed by a branch of the Imperial Houſe of *Auſtria*, ſo low, as not to be able to give the ſmalleſt check to *French* ambition.

Theſe were the doings of one reign; but, great as they were, they were only the beginnings. The next outdid them much by the advantages of an uncommon length of time which it laſted, and a relief of very great men for miniſters, almoſt perfected the ſyſtem at home, and was once, to appearance, little ſhort of the ſame ſucceſs in what was projected as to foreign affairs; for what did not *Lewis* the XIVth, with a *Mazarine*, a *Colbert*,

bert, and others, do? The very mention of the names is ſufficient. *Cætera quis neſcit?* Had it not been for the remarkable check Providence gave to the deſigns of *France* in the latter part of that long reign, after a train of ſucceſſes in former wars, under the auſpices of Queen *Anne*, and by the valour and conduct of that immortal name, which honours a country that ungratefully attempted to diſgrace him; who can ſay what kingdom or country had at this day been in poſſeſſion of their liberty? Would to God we had done what we could! and it might have been effectual to keep *France* at that low ebb to which ſhe was brought at the concluſion of that war, from a height of greatneſs that had been the aſtoniſhment as well as terror of the world: a change of the ſituation of *France* ſo much for the advantage of the general tranquility, that even the inglorious peace, that ſullies the annals of that period, could not quite efface that happy effect of its victories.

I wiſh it were as cuſtomary for us to think ſeriouſly on the ſtupendous works of that one reign of *Lewis le Grand*, as he is ſtiled, as it is to read ſome memoir or hiſtory of its exploits; nobody would then, I am confident, ſtand up and ſay, the ballance of power

power was an empty ſound, or that *Britain* had no concern with the affairs of the continent. We ſhould all rather be deeply impreſſed with the proper ideas of an epithet better known fifty years ago, becauſe then more current; but which is as true now, as it was believed to be at that time, and is of no leſs importance at this day than half a century ago; I mean, the name *Lewis* the XIVth bore, during the grand confederacy, as the *Common Enemy:* not the enemy of *England*, *Holland*, *Auſtria*, and ſo forth, but the common enemy of *Europe*; yea, of the human ſpecies; which he was with a witneſs: and ſo will his ſucceſſors be, and ought to be eſteemed, whatever ſhape they aſſume, or in whatever way their enmity appears, whether againſt this or that country, as circumſtances and opportunities invite them, ſo long as they tread the ſame path, and act on the old plan; which we have yet no ground to think they mean to abandon, but, on the contrary, the higheſt reaſon to believe it is in proſecution of it, that every commotion we ſee is raiſed by *French* influence, and every attack made, whether againſt *Great Britain*, *Pruſſia*, *Hanover*, or any other power: all are but the means to one end.

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From theſe conſiderations, I apprehend, it is indiſputably clear, that there is not a worſe-founded, nor can there be a more dangerous, opinion for *Engliſhmen*, than that we have no concern with affairs abroad; or a more unjuſt aſperſion, than to alledge, that it is for the ſake of particular connections, or attachments to any one country, that we interpoſe in the quarrels that are indeed ſtirred up on the other ſide of the channel, but far from being confined, in the extent of their conſequences, to what lies beyond that branch of the ſea.

That we may, and ſhould, be more or leſs liberal in our aſſiſtance, as it always muſt be expenſive, according to circumſtances; and that it may be more neceſſary, and even more natural, for us to take a part at one time, and for one country, than another; I ſhall be far from diſputing; and therefore, that a certain prudence and diſcretion ought to govern our continental meaſures, as they are termed: but I do, with great deference, maintain, that there can be no war kindled abroad by *France*, nor any attack made by that crown upon the moſt inſignificant prince or ſtate, that now enjoys independent ſovereignty, which will be abſolutely

ſolutely foreign to our concern, or that we can prudently conſider ourſelves as indifferent to the iſſue of the conteſt, and ought not, if we find it neceſſary, to interfere either by ſofter or ſtronger meaſures, as the exigency of the caſe requires.

For, as has been ſaid, it is not merely thoſe who immediately ſuffer the injury that we are to regard (though no doubt they may touch us nearer, or in a leſs ſenſible manner, according as we happen to be directly connected with them by intereſt, or any other tie); it is *France* itſelf that we are to keep our eye upon as the common enemy. Their ſcheme is general, and ours ought not to be limited or confined to any partial views or intereſt. The ſtruggle with them is for immoderate power; and, oppoſed to that, we are always to hold general liberty and independency to be the common cauſe in which all *Europe*, and we ourſelves in particular, are moſt deeply concerned.

It is ſelf-defence on our part againſt the common aggreſſor, and the general ſyſtem is to be attended to. To preſerve it intire is the great point; and, as I have endeavoured to ſhew, that cannot be effected, if particular members of it are not protected and

defended: we muſt conſider the whole as attacked in the perſon and property of every ſingle and individual ſtate.

Nor is it ever to be forgot, that in proportion to the ſtake that the different branches of the ſyſtem have, they are concerned for the ſupport of the whole, and ought to exert their ſtrength accordingly; from which it will follow, that as we cannot deny but our own ſhare in the ſtake is the largeſt, without doubt we ought to take the greateſt concern in providing for its ſecurity.

England, as has been obſerved, ſeems rather to be the great object of *French* ambition. They thruſt at us through the ſides of others, who muſt be felled like trees in their way, to come at us effectually; though indeed, to do them juſtice, they ſeldom now-a-days kindle a combuſtion, but we find ourſelves immediately, if not firſt, in the midſt of the flame; other projects being uſed as auxiliary to our overthrow. For, I think, it can admit of little diſpute, that, were *England* conquered, *France* would be in a fair way to get the upperhand in *Europe*; and, if they could think of defeating us at once, or in a ſort of ſingle combat, other ſchemes would not be called in to the aid; but, becauſe

cauſe we are yet too many for them, they muſt firſt add to their own ſtrength by ſwallowing up or debilitating other ſtates; the effect of which is, that beſides the power it throws into the *French* ſcale, it greatly leſſens our own, dries up the ſources of our force, and wounds the very ſinews of our conſtitution, our trade and commerce, which wholly depend on our connections with other countries, which connections muſt fail when thoſe countries fall under *French* power or influence.

I am ſo much ſatisfied in my own mind that there is no part of the *French* ſyſtem or plan, and conſequently of their conduct, but what is in ſome degree intereſting to us; that, were it not for the prejudice I know there is againſt the opinion extended to the length I have already carried it, I would not ſcruple to go a ſtep farther, as my own conviction inclines me to think, that we are not only concerned when we ſee *France* invading or attacking other countries, but have reaſon to pay ſome regard and attention to what paſſes within herſelf.

Repeated inſtances have proved to us, how conſiderable an engine it is in the hands of the *French* government to interfere in our

domeſtic affairs, by the rebellions they have been inſtrumental in raiſing and fomenting in this country, which have not wanted influence on the ſtate of *Europe*. And we know, that beſides the loſs of thoſe unfortunate people (for a loſs it is for any country to be drained of its ſubjects) whom they have abuſed, by making them tools in their attempts to impoſe a prince upon us, they never want a conſiderable body of *Britiſh* ſubjects in their army, by means of a national corps, which they keep up as a trap to ſeduce poor deluded creatures from their natural allegiance, which ſhews that nothing is too trifling, or too far out of their way, or of the ſcheme of their policy, that can in the leaſt hurt us; well knowing how much a nation is weakened by inteſtine broils, and that it is a high ſtroke in politics to ſhed our enemies blood by their own hands.

I would not be underſtood as if I meant to ſay, that we ſhould retaliate the vices of the *French* government upon them, which would be contrary to the ingenuity I wiſh always to ſee prevail in the principles of *Britiſh* independence; but neither do I think that the inhabitants of *France*, ſo far as they do not themſelves forfeit their natural claim

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to it, are excluded from the benefits of that regard to human liberty, which, I truſt, will never fail to be a ſacred part of our ſyſtem; and, if aſſiſting their endeavours to recover it, had the ſmalleſt tendency to ſupport the common cauſe, it ſhould appear to me no improper exerciſe of our inclinations to maintain it.

The fate of kingdoms does, in many reſpects, depend upon their own conduct, as often appears with wonderful certainty; and perhaps amongſt the many ſurpriſing circumſtances of the preſent times, there are ſome peculiar to the ſtate of *France*, which may be juſtly reckoned not the leaſt conſiderable, or altogether deſtitute of a good proſpect to the friends of liberty.

We ſee what diverſions are among them; how high the diſputes have run between the King and Parliament; how eager the conteſt is between the eccleſiaſtic and ſecular power; and who can ſay what may be the iſſue of theſe things, or what is in the womb of an All-wiſe Providence? For my own part, as I cannot help reverencing that noble ſpirit the *French* parliament has ſhewn of late, like the laſt groans of expiring liberty, or rather the pangs of a ſecond-birth to it, I would almoſt

almoſt hope it may produce ſomething in which *Europe* would rejoice.

And here again I would repeat the obſervation formerly made upon the conſequences, we muſt be ſenſible the change of the *French* conſtitution and government has had on all *Europe*. The firſt part of their ſcheme againſt the general liberty, was to bring *France* itſelf into ſlavery, which was accompliſhed by turning a limited monarchy into the moſt deſpotic power. This, without entering into particulars, muſt have produced theſe viſible effects, that it at once corrupted the principles and enlarged the power of the government. The effect of the one is to introduce an inſatiable thirſt for extenſion of ſway and dominion, not to be found where a ſpirit of liberty reigns: and the other makes way for attaining it by the command it gives over the ſubjects property, to laviſh it away in boundleſs attempts to oppreſs their neighbours.

Theſe are the principles on which my notions of the balance of power are formed, and, conſiſtently with them, I cannot allow myſelf to doubt of the reality of its exiſtence, or the importance of its preſervation;

tion; neither can I imagine it a matter of no moment, or even of ſmall conſequence, to us, that any of the powers that now ſubſiſts in *Europe*, ſhould be ſwallowed up by *France*; and particularly whether *Pruſſia* or *Hanover* fall a ſacrifice to the ambitious deſigns of that reſtleſs and turbulent neighbour: and conſequently I cannot doubt, but it is our buſineſs to give all the help we can to prevent it, and all the countenance and ſupport in our power to ſpare to the common cauſe, at the head of which the brave King of *Pruſſia* has put himſelf, with an unparalleled greatneſs of ſpirit, riſking the whole for the whole.

What I have ſuggeſted on this ſubject, leads me to make theſe general reflections: That a juſt conception of the balance of power, which I have endeavoured to ſhew conſiſts in the preſervation of every particular ſtate, comprehends a very large and extenſive view: that it is the reverſe of limited and confined notions: that it deſtroys all partial regards, and tends to eſtabliſh a general and diffuſive concern for the welfare of mankind: that the friends of it are the friends of liberty; and thoſe who

would

would deſtroy it, the common enemies of mankind: that the nations who conſult their own ſecurity, muſt be firmly attached to the preſervation of this balance: that, in vain do we imagine it can be maintained without a juſt regard to our neighbours as well as to ourſelves, and to all that are embarked on the ſame bottom with us: and that a watchful eye ſhould conſtantly be kept over the counſels of the grand enemy, and the Princes and States dependent upon, or connected with that power.

Hence we ſee that nothing of a public nature can paſs in the moſt remote corner of *Europe*, foreign to the ſtability of the general ſyſtem: more eſpecially that any great revolution or change in the conſtitution or government of any one country, or its connections with others, and, above all, the political alliances of the ſeveral powers as they vary and fluctuate, are inſeparably connected with it, and ought therefore to be an object of the ſtricteſt attention of all wiſe and well-diſpoſed councils.

It is grievous to obſerve it: but the preſent circumſtances of *Europe* afford a ſtrong proof of the great importance of alliances, and the neceſſity of attending to them. The hereditary

tary oppoſition and rivalſhip between the two Houſes of *Auſtria* and *Bourbon* has for many ages paſt been a ſafeguard to the liberties of *Europe*, the power of theſe families having hitherto been a pretty equal poiſe to each other: but we now ſee a thing that hardly could have been foretold or expected, a confederacy of theſe two powers; particles, it muſt be confeſt, ſo heterogeneous, that it is not probable the coalition will ſubſiſt long; but the very junction, however ſhort it may prove, is dangerous to the laſt degree, and the conſequences of it we already feel too bitterly not to be alarmed.

Had *France* ſtood, as ſhe did the laſt war, ſeparated from, or oppoſed to, the Empreſs Queen, the war had been at this day in *Flanders*; and we know how tedious and coſtly a conqueſt that is: but now, by having nothing to do on that ſide but to aſſume a relinquiſhed poſſeſſion, and enter gates ſet wide for her reception, not only is her power turned againſt *Germany*, but the combined ſtrength of the unforeſeen allies is pointed there, and the conſequence of this ſtrange event is, that *Holland* is laid open, which ties up her hands, if ſhe were more inclined to move than ſhe ſeems to be, and

affords ſomewhat of a plauſible pretext for a conduct, which probably was more the cauſe, than it is in truth the effect, of the bridle they have ſo quietly ſubmitted to.

This we may be pretty ſure of, if paſt experience can at all help us to foretell futurity, that the Empreſs Queen has, moſt unhappily for *Europe*, and for us in particular, as well as in the end it may appear for herſelf, become the dupe of *French* intrigue; but, as we ſee the miſchievous conſequences of the union that ſubſiſts for the time, we muſt perceive the abſolute neceſſity there is for our throwing all the weight we can into the oppoſite ſcale. Our great hopes are in the King of *Pruſſia*, and he may, if properly ſupported, be able to bring things back to their equilibre, and to let the Empreſs feel the folly of her conduct; but if that heroic Prince is not ſupported, God knows how matters may go.

Some years ago an alarm was taken from an alliance, perhaps new, but not, for aught I can ſee, ſo unnatural as was pretended. When the King of *Spain* attacked the Emperor, the quadruple alliance had been formed to prevent a general war being kindled, which it effected; but as the terms were not

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to the ſatisfaction of *Spain*, the congreſs of *Cambray* was thought neceſſary, in order to fix the tranquility of *Europe* on a ſolid baſis: The views of it were, however, diſappointed, by a ſudden treaty clapt up between the courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, in conſequence of a private negotiation. What happened then? The union, it is true, did not long ſubſiſt. But did the other great powers look on it with indifference? No. *France* herſelf joined the Maritime Powers, by the treaty concluded at *Hanover*: the profeſſed view of which was, their common ſecurity againſt, I truly believe, a very imaginary hazard. However, this laſt-mentioned treaty broke the neck of the other alliance.

The part which *England* took in that affair was indeed cenſured by ſome of our greateſt ſtateſmen: and that very treaty of *Hanover* was made one of the grounds of accuſation againſt the then Miniſter. Nor do I take upon me to ſay it was an unexceptionable meaſure: for as I have no idea, that *France* ever can be bound by any treaty, to the true intereſt of *Europe*, I am apt to believe, every alliance or junction of power that offends her, is for the good of the common cauſe, to which ſhe is the known enemy: and I

am ſure, it is for the particular intereſt of this country to be on good terms with *Spain*, and that to detach her from any dependence on the court of *Verſailles*, has always been underſtood to be a ſound *Britiſh* maxim, the purſuit of which ought to go hand in hand with a care to preſerve the ſtrength of the Houſe of *Auſtria:* both for the ſame end of keeping *France* down.

According to my weak judgment, therefore, *England* had reaſon to promote a friendſhip between the Emperor and *Spain*, and to join in the alliance, rather than do any thing to defeat it. But ſtill the conduct of *France* on that occaſion affords ſubſtantial evidence of the importance of a proper union of ſtrength againſt her: as any thing like an alliance for that purpoſe, or the loſs of one of her dependent friends, gives her the alarm; and her fears of it ought to be our ſtrongeſt motives to bring it about.

If the treaty of *Vienna* was ſo dangerous to *France*, in her own opinion, that it forced her to do a thing very unlike herſelf; I mean joining with the Maritime Powers; and if the treaty of *Hanover*, by which that of *Vienna* was defeated, was brought about, as loudly ſaid, by *French* influence in our councils;

cils; ſurely now, when *France* and *Auſtria* are combined, which, without doubt, is a conjunction as dangerous as uncommon, we are loudly called upon to make the beſt alliance that poſſibly we can, for a poiſe againſt that monſter of power. And this, I think, we ſhall do, if we purſue the meaſures I have been arguing for, remain ſteady to our alliance with the King of *Pruſſia*, and give him the moſt powerful ſupport we can. I wiſh we could bring the Catholic King into action, in concert with his *Sardinian* Majeſty, our old and faithful ally. That might produce a very happy diverſion upon the ſide of *Italy*.

Such an inſtance as that I have juſt now mentioned clearly ſhows how real the ballance of power is, and what neceſſity there is to maintain it.

And indeed I might aſk, When was the time when it was not regarded, and provided for, by the ſeveral powers of *Europe*, taking different meaſures according to the neceſſity of circumſtances.

It has, however, been ſometimes repreſented as a new conceit, and a ſtart-up notion, and that our attachment to the Continent of late years has been the effect of certain

certain particular connections, with which we were formerly unacquainted. That inſinuation, doubtleſs, has had effect upon weak minds, fit to be wrought upon by prejudices:——but a very ſuperficial acquaintance with hiſtory ſhould, I think, ſatisfy any impartial perſon how groundleſs that pretence is.

Was it any thing but a regard to the ballance of power that occaſioned the great war about the *Spaniſh* ſucceſſion? the very purpoſe of which, and of the treaties of partition of the dominions that the laſt King of *Spain* of the *Auſtrian* family died in poſſeſſion of, being to prevent too much power coming into one hand. And all the precedeing wars with *Lewis* the XIVth were nothing elſe than the effect of that Prince's ambitious views, which puſhed him on, regardleſs of all treaties, and of all juſtice, to attack his neighbours one after another; with no other deſign, than to increaſe his own power at their expence: and to prevent which, ſtrong confederacies were always formed againſt him, being conſidered as the common enemy.

It was upon theſe principles (ſo far are they from being new) that the *Engliſh* and *Dutch*,

Dutch, after ſome time fooliſhly enough doing the *French* King's work for him, by fighting againſt one another, made up their idle quarrel, and concluded the triple alliance, *Sweden* making the third contracting party, merely to ſet bounds for *France*. And when, by the intrigue of the Ducheſs of *Orleans*, who was ſent over to *England* on purpoſe to perſuade her brother *Charles* the IId. into it, *Lewis* got the triple alliance diſſolved, and fell at once upon the *Dutch* in 1672; the Emperor and *Spain* took part againſt *France*, and the Parliament of *England* forced the King to aſſiſt the *Dutch*, which made an end of the war.

Theſe are inſtances of *Engliſh* meaſures before the Revolution: ſo that nothing can be more unjuſt than to aſcribe our conduct, which has ſince proceeded on the ſame plan, to any particular connections, either with *Holland* in King *William*'s reign, or with *Germany* ſince the happy acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family.

It is plain, that it is the true *Engliſh* ſpirit, and the proper plan of *Engliſh* government, to take a juſt ſhare in the affairs of the Continent: and that, ſo far from being, as has been ſaid, the only people who officiouſly

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meddle where they have no immediate intereſt of their own, we ſhould be ſingular of all the powers in *Europe*, if we ſtood by when theſe commotions ariſe.

I have mentioned inſtances of ſome the moſt conſiderable of them happening; and there are of all of them, at one time or another. Nor can any period, I believe, be pointed out, when *England* acted another part. Even during the Uſurpation we ſent a fleet into the *Baltick*, with the *Dutch*, on occaſion of a quarrel between the *Swedes* and the *Danes*. And the ſame meaſure was followed in the end of King *William*'s reign, as well as much later, to keep the peace of the North. Such influences, it is juſtly eſteem'd, the leſſer and ſubordinate ballances have upon the general one, that we muſt not allow even the ſmaller powers to hurt one another: much leſs can we be inactive ſpectators, when the whole ſyſtem is attacked, as we may be ſure is always the caſe when the common enemy ſtirs.——Then is there a call to all the friends of liberty, all who wiſh to be free, to put their hand to their ſword.

This doctrine is no novelty. Reaſon teaches, and experience confirms it. It cannot fail, that

that whenever one power becomes over-grown, all the reſt muſt dwindle, and be inconſiderable.

The world was for many ages the prey of a ſucceſſion of monſters of power, which deſtroyed one another: but while they ſubſiſted ſeverally, like Leviathans, devoured all the ſmaller Fiſh. I need not aſk, Who would wiſh to ſee another *Alexander* riſe, or be fond of an univerſal empire being eſtabliſhed, ſuch as laſt fell with the *Romans?* Who would even like to behold as much power in one family as the Emperor *Charles* the Vth, or his ſon *Philip* the IId. of *Spain*, poſſeſſed? In both of whoſe reigns the other powers of *Europe* made but a ſilly figure. *France* would engroſs univerſal monarchy or power; but *Europe* muſt not ſuffer it. She is already rather too ſtrong, and it is not for the general intereſt her force ſhould increaſe. All hands therefore ſhould fall to work, to ſtem the tide of her ambition.

The tendency of what I have ſaid has been to ſhow, that, out of regard to ourſelves, and our own ſafety, we muſt, ought, and cannot avoid to interpoſe; as it is, in truth, but to *defend*, when or where-ever *France* makes an attack. But there is yet a conſideration, which

I cannot paſs over; and I mention it with the greater pleaſure as well as confidence, becauſe ſomething like it dropt from the n—— L——d who firſt oppoſed the motion I referred you to, or was at leaſt for varying it.

His L———p ſaid (and the thing pleaſed me much), that not only for our own ſakes would he be content to do ſomething for the aſſiſtance of other powers, but even for humanity's ſake, would he dare to ſuffer ſomewhat. It was nobly ſaid; like an *Engliſhman*. It breathed the air of this climate. And indeed I think, independent of the argument that has been urged, this one obſervation puts the thing in a light that muſt ſtrike every ingenuous mind.

Providence has made this a great country. We are the firſt of the Proteſtant powers; at the head of that glorious, that divine cauſe; and I hope we ſhall always boaſt of being the aſſerters of human liberty. I truſt alſo, that *England* will never be ſo little, as not to be able to do ſomething for others, or ever unwilling to lend a helping hand to the oppreſſed.

We all allow, it is moſt inconſiſtent with the character of true greatneſs for a man to be wrapt up in himſelf, void of all feeling for

for his own ſpecies. And the principles that govern human conduct are much the ſame in one and in a combination of many men. There is a morality of character in a nation, as well as in a particular perſon. Every ſtate ſuſtains a certain figure, and bears a certain condition; and, according to its order, and the advantages it enjoys, ought to exert itſelf in every thing that is, or is allied to, the common and juſt cauſe of mankind; which liberty can never ceaſe to be.

Thank God! we ſtand in ſo illuſtrious a rank amongſt the powers of *Europe:* and as God has been kind to us, let us be well diſpoſed towards our brethren, mankind, and never turn our eye from the diſtreſſed, or oppreſſed.

We did well, and like ourſelves, when we ſent a national relief to *Portugal*, as other countries too did, on occaſion of the late terrible cataſtrophe of that kingdom. I hope it proceeded not barely from an intereſted view, on account of the commercial connections that ſubſiſt betwixt the two nations; but rather that a pure moral principle was the ſpring of our munificence; and the ſame principle is equally operative in other things. Liberty is more valuable than life: and, if we would

ſuccour the one, we ought to vindicate and ſupport the other.

I have not the ſmalleſt doubt that it is our duty to act on the principles of univerſal benevolence in a national and political as well as in a private capacity; and that, as a nation, we are accountable for our conduct, and the uſe we make of national advantages, not only in reſpect of ourſelves, but of other nations, as much as each individual is accountable for his own behaviour; with this acknowleged difference, becauſe it is a neceſſary one, that the preſent only can be the ſtate of retribution to communities. There is a mutual relation between nation and nation, as there is between perſon and perſon; and a certain duty ariſing from it in the one as well as the other's caſe: and, as I am perſuaded *England* has its national character no leſs than other countries, I hope we ſhall always maintain it with honour, for public juſtice and faith, and a firm attachment to the cauſe of liberty; and that wherever it is invaded, we ſhall not think it a foreign quarrel.

* Nor ought Religion to be quite forgot in this queſtion. The ſeaſon of holy wars is over; and there is not, perhaps, true religion enough

enough to be found in the bulk of men to animate them to fight for it; but there is ſo much of temporal intereſt connected with the name of religion, that it is far from having loſt its influence. We know the fury that the Popiſh faith inſpires; and, whatever elſe we may be, I hope it is a ſmall part of us that are not enemies to it, and would be ſorry to ſee it gain ground, as we cannot but be ſenſible it carries along with it a tyranny over the moſt ſacred and unalienable rights of mankind.

But we ſee with what zeal Popery is kept up and propagated; what pains are taken to debauch Proteſtant princes from their profeſſed faith; and we alſo ſee the conſequence theſe things have on the Proteſtant intereſt: nor can we be blind to the effect that any addition to the Popiſh, or diminution of the Proteſtant intereſt in *Europe*, has upon the general cauſe of liberty.

Slavery is the right-hand attendant of Popery, and perſecution for conſcience ſake its inſeparable companion: the two greateſt curſes that can befall mankind. Therefore it was that, in the beginning of this letter, I expreſſed my hopes, that the preſervation of a *Proteſtant Power* would be a thing this country would have at heart.

The Proteſtant religion has not the advantage of that unhallowed fire, on the wings of which the other ſpreads: but, for God's ſake! let it not loſe ground, ſo far as we can poſſibly prevent it: let not us, who have the honour to be the greateſt Proteſtant power, loſe or renounce the glorious character of being the Defender of the true Chriſtian faith: a title which adds luſtre to the *Britiſh* crown.

A n——e L—d did, with great propriety, take notice of the fatal blunder of *James* I. who would not, even when his parliament preſſed him, aſſiſt the poor Proteſtants of *Bohemia*, and his own ſon-in-law the Elector *Palatine*, whom they had choſen for their King, and the vindicator of their liberty. It is well known how unſavoury the memory of that Prince continues to this day on that account: and I doubt if any ſo good reaſon can be aſſigned for his ill-judged and unnatural conduct, as his own too great attachment to ſuperſtition, and the heart-love he had of arbitrary power.

But let not our poſterity curſe us; nor let us expoſe ourſelves to the hazard that, in the nature of the thing, a weakening of the Proteſtant intereſt abroad, threatens our liberty and religion at home; as deſtroying the ballance

lance of power ſhakes the ſecurity of our poſſeſſion of both theſe valuable bleſſings; nor let us provoke the Divine judgments by deſerting the good cauſe.

The cauſe of Liberty, and of the Proteſtant Religion, is the cauſe of God himſelf: and as he can reward thoſe that fight for it, ſo can he ſeverely chaſtiſe thoſe that do it not: and he has denounced an awful curſe, which ſtands upon authentic record, againſt them who come not out to battle againſt his enemies.

The inſtance juſt now referred to has a ſtriking influence this way. The poſterity of that forlorn Princeſs, who got the title of Queen, and ſhared with her illuſtrious conſort the loſs of his original dignity and hereditary dominions, for eſpouſing the cauſe of liberty and religion, we now, bleſſed be God for it! ſee elevated to the throne of theſe kingdoms; while the firſt branch of the deſcendents of her father, who with cruelty refuſed to aſſiſt her, is juſtly expelled from the crown by a forfeiture, whereof he himſelf ſowed the firſt ſeeds, in thoſe principles of deſpotiſm which he tranſmitted to them.

It is evident that the King of *Pruſſia* has now put himſelf at the head of what I will

beg

beg leave to call the Proteſtant Cauſe and the Cauſe of Liberty. The great Powers againſt him are the ſtrength of the Popiſh intereſt: bigotry and tyranny are the characters of the houſe of *Bourbon*; and in theſe, as well as power, has the family of *Auſtria* been their conſtant rival. On the conteſt now begun, I think, hangs the fate of the Proteſtant intereſt, and of Liberty (for I cannot ſeparate them), to be determined by the iſſue, whether it ſhall ſink or ſwim. His *Pruſſian* Majeſty has ſtaked not only his crown, but his Electoral principality; *Hanover* and *Heſſe Caſſel* are the next moſt conſiderable Proteſtant Princes in the Empire; and they all depend on the ſame events. Should we then, I again aſk it, heſitate to interpoſe, with all the vigour we can, in ſupport of them?

Theſe are general, but I think important, conſiderations, which I have taken the liberty to mention: and to myſelf they appear founded in the true notions of the ſyſtem of *Europe*, and of the dependence of particulars on the preſervation of the whole, and the cloſe connection there is between the cauſe of Liberty and the Proteſtant Religion: and, for my own part, I cannot but think they are ſufficient, were there no other more particu-

lar

lar reaſons or arguments to ſtir up our zeal for theſe our allies, and to convince us it is both our duty and our intereſt to ſupport them.

But neither are there wanting thoſe motives of a more private and intereſting nature, ariſing from the particular connections that ſubſiſt between this country and the dominions of *Pruſſia* and *Hanover*.

It may be laid down as a poſition that admits of no diſpute, That as trade and commerce are the vitals of our ſtate, all that we have in lieu of a *Mexico* and *Peru*, it is our intereſt, and conſequently the duty of our government, to give the greateſt attention to whatever is connected with the commercial intereſt of the nation. And that there are ſuch connections betwixt us and the dominions of the Elector of *Hanover*, and the King of *Pruſſia*, will not be denied; and that they are of great importance to the *Britiſh* commerce; inſomuch that it has of late been made a ſubject of inquiry, how far theſe connections, particularly with the *Hanoverian* dominions, might be improved to the advantage of this country: an inquiry, to which, I own, I was willing to liſten with attention for this reaſon; That nothing has given me

greater concern than the apprehenſion which is too prevailing not to be obſerved, that theſe dominions are a drawback and dead weight upon *Great Britain:* and all the friends of the King, at leaſt, would certainly wiſh, that there were no foundation for ſuch an opinion; and that, if it can be done, it were demonſtrated to the ſatisfaction of the people, as we muſt be ſenſible what a perpetual ground for murmuring this is.

I am far from ſaying, that *Great Britain* has not a juſt title to expect that her own intereſts are not to be ſacrificed or neglected for the ſake of any ſeparate or independent eſtate poſſeſſed by its Sovereign: at the ſame time I cannot diſſemble, that I think we are too apt to be uneaſy, and more forward to vent our diſquiet, upon account of the *German* dominions, than is fit; and ſometimes in a manner that, to me, ſeems hardly conſiſtent with the reſpect we owe his Majeſty.

The caſe plainly is, that the neceſſity of our own ſituation made us call the family of *Hanover* to the throne of theſe kingdoms, as the only means the nation could ſee of continuing our ſecurity againſt Popery, Tyranny, and Arbitrary Power, from which we had been

been happily delivered by the Revolution: and, as it would have been vain to expect, and, I think, fooliſh to aſk, the family to abdicate its own proper patrimony even for the crown of *Great Britain*, the attaining of which no good prince, or any wiſe man, will conſider in any other view than that of accepting a truſt, and a very troubleſome one, without any real profit, for our protection, and the preſervation of our happy conſtitution.

For however good the title of his Majeſty and his illuſtrious houſe to the crown is (and I believe it to be the beſt in the world), the free grant of the people, thoſe for whoſe benefit government is beſtowed, and with whom I have no doubt the only real right to confer it is lodged, and from whoſe conſent the power to exerciſe it only flows; a title that, I am alſo confident, no length of time will derogate from, but the lateſt ages ſee confirmed by the growing affection of a happy and perhaps a wiſer people: yet I muſt acknowlege there is ſome difference to be made between the tenure by which his Majeſty holds what may be called his own dominions, in contradiſtinction to the crown of *Great Britain*: and it would be hard to cut off that retreat which they afford, were the remoteſt chance of a

change in our government to be ſuppoſed; nor can I ſee any right we have to do it, and conſequently no reaſon to grudge that it is not done; ſince it was no part of the original compact, or of the terms upon which the crown of *Great Britain* was given and accepted; which now makes it impoſſible that there can be a ſeparation between the different dominions, ſo long at leaſt as matters continue upon the footing we certainly wiſh they ſhould: nay, I can freely go a ſtep farther; for I own, whatever may be commonly thought and ſaid, as the thing appears to me, it was *We*, and not the family of *Hanover*, who received the favour, when they were called to this government; and therefore I think there is a certain piece of juſtice in this, that we ſhould not complain too heavily of any burden, if ſuch be the caſe, that our near connection with that family may have brought upon us; providing always that it be not, by miſconduct of any kind, upon whomſoever chargeable, rendered more grievous than in the nature and neceſſity of the thing it ſhould; of which, whenever I obſerve it, I ſhall for one not be the laſt to complain.

But tho' theſe are my own ſentiments, in reſpect

reſpect of this matter, yet ſtill, as I ſaid, I ſhould be pleaſed to ſee the thing upon a footing that would give univerſal ſatisfaction; which doubtleſs would be the effect of ſhewing, that our connections with *Hanover* might, by a proper care and cultivation, be made advantageous rather than hurtful to us: and therefore I was happy to find any attempt made to point that out, and, to ſay the truth, as I had entertained ſome ſuch prepoſſeſſion before, I am glad to ſee, at leaſt, ſufficient reaſon againſt being violent in the oppoſite extreme.

At any rate certain it is, that the diſadvantages of *Hanover* are not in the commercial way; the connections of trade with that country, and the places belonging to it, being not only favourable, but valuable, to us; which is what I meant to mention as an intereſting motive of obligation, upon our own account, to ſupport and protect the *German* dominions of our King.

Germany is one of the great markets for *Engliſh* manufactures and commodities; and one part at leaſt of the value of *Holland* to us is, that the *Dutch* merchants take great quantities of goods from this country, not only for their own conſumption, but to ſend up

to *Flanders* and *Germany*, where there is a large opening, and in all the great fairs of which, vaſt quantities of *Engliſh* goods are always to be found (it is ſo yet, though perhaps not ſo much as has been formerly, for a reaſon I ſhall hereafter mention; and this is done by the communication *Holland* has with *Germany* by the *Rhine*.

But then there is alſo an opening into *Germany* on the other ſide, by means of theſe great rivers, the *Aller*, *Weſer*, and *Elbe*, of all which the Elector of *Hanover* is now maſter, and by which we poſſeſſed a very conſiderable branch of trade, even before the acceſſion of the duchies of *Bremen* and *Verden* to the Elector of *Hanover*; which acquiſitions have not a little added to the advantages of it, as was foreſeen by the *Britiſh* parliament, when they wiſely enough, though that alſo was made the ſubject of clamour, contributed towards making the purchaſe.

The *Elbe* itſelf runs above 500 miles thro' *Bohemia*, *Saxony*, *Brandenburgh*, and the reſt of *Germany*; and the *Weſer* more than 250 through the countries of *Heſſe*, *Weſtphalia*, and others of the Empire; and by theſe ſtreams the woollen, and other manufactures

tures of *England* are conveyed, and likewiſe the growths of our *American* plantations.

It would be needleſs here to enter upon particular computations of the extent of this branch of our commerce, which I muſt myſelf take upon the credit of others more converſant in that ſcience: but I imagine it will be admitted by every one that knows any thing of the matter, to be very conſiderable.

It is alſo ſaid, and not altogether without ground, that the friendſhip of the Elector of *Hanover*, which may certainly be depended upon, gives an additional ſecurity to the continuance of our trade to *Hamburgh*, which is another great article of our commerce, and a ſource of much wealth, which centers in this kingdom by the retreat of our *Hamburgh* merchants after they have made their fortunes.

It is well known of what value and importance the *Britiſh* factory reſiding in that great trading city is, which has a ſettlement peculiar to itſelf, and makes no ſmall figure in that commonwealth. *Hamburgh* is to *Germany* what *Amſterdam* is to *Europe*, a magazine of the merchandizes of the

the trading world; and the *Engliſh* manufactures have no inferior place in the collection, and are from thence iſſued, ſo far as they do not go directly from *England*, up the *Weſer* and the *Elbe*, or paſs by the way of *Holland*, into *Germany*. Nor is it any real loſs that they circulate through *Hamburgh*, as it is our own ſubjects ſettled there who have the benefit of this mediation of commerce, and who have alſo in their hands a great part of the trade carried on from that place to *Ruſſia* and *Livonia*, and other parts of the world, ſuch as *Spain*, *Portugal*, the *Mediterranean*, &c.

The concern which the Elector of *Hanover* has in this matter, ſo far as is valuable to us, ariſes from the command he has of the navigation to and from *Hamburgh*, by means of his own city of *Stade*, which lies on the *Elbe* below *Hamburgh*, of *Brunhauſen* at the mouth of the *Schwing*, and of *Lawenburgh* upon the *Elbe*, above *Hamburgh*. *Stade* itſelf once enjoyed that very commerce which is now in the poſſeſſion of *Hamburgh*, and might very probably be able, by the encouragement its Prince could give it, to recover it again, if any trouble from *Hamburgh* made it neceſſary for the *Britiſh* merchants to

change their reſidence, who would at leaſt carry with them ſome of the trade, for *Stade* has all natural advantages equal, and ſome ſuperior, to *Hamburgh*; and *Harburgh*, which is another port belonging to the Elector of *Hanover*, lying almoſt oppoſite to *Hamburgh*, on the river *Lotze*, and very little inferior to it, might be made to anſwer the ſame purpoſe: but theſe towns are of uſe at preſent both to the trade of *Hamburgh*, and that carried on directly from *England* by the *Elbe*, nor is it deſirable for us to ſee a neceſſity for the experiment of any variation in that matter *.

I do not, therefore, think it can well be ſaid, that dominions ſo connected with us in trade, ought to be neglected, as it ſhould ſeem the protection of them is the defence of our own intereſt.

The King of *Pruſſia* has a good title of the ſame kind to our ſupport. The chanel of the trade which our merchants carry on from *Hamburgh* to *Poland*, and the north part of the Empire is the rivers *Oder* and the *Spree*, which fall into the *Elbe* in the Marquiſate of *Brandenburgh*, and is ſo far under his power: and his Majeſty now

* *Poſtlethwait* has treated at large on this ſubject.

has, by *Pruſſia* on the one hand, and *Gueldres* on the other, a free communication with the ſea, which he can turn to the advantage of any trading ſtate in friendſhip with him.

Let us then but reflect whether it can be a matter of indifference to us to abandon or retain ſuch avenues of commerce: for it muſt hold as an undoubted maxim, that if we would preſerve our trade, we muſt keep our cuſtomers, and, in order to that, we muſt protect and defend them when neceſſary; and, I believe, it will be admitted, that we ſhould not have this trade with the ſame advantages that at preſent we may reaſonably expect, and, in ſome ſort I may be allowed to ſay, command, if theſe territories, on which it depends, were not in the hands of their preſent Sovereigns: perhaps we ſhould loſe it altogether, were they to come into the poſſeſſion of an enemy of this nation.

We depended a good deal more than we would wiſh to do for a valuable branch of commerce, on *Sweden*, when that crown had *Bremen* and *Verden*: but if we were to ſuppoſe *France* to ſnatch them, as ſhe would be glad to do, where ſhould we be? That the trade would be loſt to us, is the leaſt part of the conſequence of ſuch a change; for

it would be gained to *France*, which is of much greater moment to us and to *Europe*, conſidering the additional weight of power which ſuch an acquiſition of territory and commerce would throw into the ſcale of *France*, at the expence of the friends of liberty, and the Proteſtant religion.

We regret, and juſtly, the loſs of *Minorca*, and ſhould have the like reaſon to be alarmed at any hazard of *Gibraltar*, becauſe the preſervation and ſecurity of our *Italian*, *Turky*, and *Levant* trade, depends ſo much upon the poſſeſſion of thoſe places; and, upon conſiderations of the ſame ſort, ought we to be concerned for the electoral dominions of *Hanover*, and thoſe of the King of *Pruſſia*.

Nobody denies the importance of the connection between this country and *Holland*. Formerly it was the mutual opinion of both nations, that we were bound by intereſt to ſupport each other: and, whatever may be the caſe of the *Dutch*, I believe that ſtill continues to be our ſenſe of the matter; and one part of the reaſon, as has already been taken notice of, is the advantage we reap by *Holland*, as one of the chanels of our trade with the Continent. This we alſo ſee is the caſe as to *Hanover* and *Pruſſia*, and therefore

the argument is equally concluſive with regard to them.

But the other view, which has alſo been hinted at, is of no leſs moment, in which our intereſt in the preſervation of *Holland*, and *Hanover* and *Pruſſia*, lies, I mean the defence of our religion and liberty. Theſe have always connected us with *Holland* as well as our trade does. I am ſorry that the latter has, by the woeful connections that have now too long ſubſiſted between *Holland* and *France*, not only been diminiſhed (for I fear *France* has wreſted a great part of the *Dutch* trade from us) but has alſo, to appearance, loſt its political influence, and perhaps been uſed againſt us by jealouſies ariſing from a ſuppoſed rivalſhip, which, however, might, with due care and attention, poſſibly be removed. But our religion and liberty muſt, if reaſon does not altogether depart from *Dutchmen*, or their profeſſion of religion change, be a tie, the ſtrength of which ſhould appear; and here there is no jealouſy, nor any place for rivalling one another. And I apprehend the ſame thing ought to be a bond of union betwixt us and thoſe Proteſtant ſtates of *Germany*, *Pruſſia* and *Hanover*.

I will

I will not pretend to enter on the conſideration of many things that have been very ingeniouſly ſuggeſted by ſenſible men, how far theſe countries might be, and how far it is our intereſt they were, raiſed to a greater degree of power than they yet poſſeſs, and even be made maritime ſtates; or how ſuch a project might be conciliated to the mind of the *Engliſh* nation, who would naturally enough be alarmed with it at firſt view: but this I may venture to ſay, that *Pruſſia* and *Hanover* are the natural allies of *Great Britain*, and that it were rather to be wiſhed theſe countries had more power, even maritime, than that the power of *France* ſhould increaſe.

Were we and they properly united, it is hard to ſay what influence it might have on the other northern powers. Without the ſpirit of prophecy we may gueſs, that there would be a greater probability of getting and keeping thoſe courts attached to our intereſt, rather than to the court of *France*, which has for a great while held ſome of them in chains of very mean dependence, contrary to their own true intereſt, as well as that of *Europe*, and to ſee them more ſteady to the common cauſe, in ſpite of the

influence

influence of the enemies thereof. And certainly if ſuch a connection and alliance could be formed, not on temporary conſiderations of preſent gain, but on the ſolid baſis of a real union and reciprocation of intereſt, we might hope it would go farther to humble the Houſe of *Bourbon*, than any other deſign we have yet ſeen, or at preſent expect.

But all I now plead for is, not to let us loſe any of the ſtrength of the Proteſtant intereſt, and cauſe of Liberty, eſpecially not to ſuffer the enemy, already overgrown in power, to increaſe her ſtrength by freſh ſpoils; but to defend and protect thoſe who are now attacked, in hopes of being hereafter able to make them of greater uſe, and more importance, by conſtituting a firm league and coalition of force, that may prove a real bulwark to Liberty, and the ſecurity of the Proteſtant religion.

And, while we are ſometimes complaining of want of allies, and that too great a ſhare of the burden lies on us, complaints for which I do not ſay there is no reaſon, let us not loſe, or throw away, good allies, thoſe that are natural, and in whom we have ſome ground of truſt; but let us ſuccour and ſupport them, that others may be encouraged to

join

join the confederacy. Union makes ſtrength, and ſtrength produces more ſtrength;—— power procures acceſſions to itſelf; many who otherways would not, nay, who for convenience ſake would, even againſt their inclination, take the oppoſite ſide, will rather join the juſt cauſe, when they have that proſpect of ſafety, which the ſtrength of a good, well-concerted, and firm alliance gives.

Thus have I conſidered the ties of intereſt both of a general and more particular nature, which, in my humble apprehenſion, do, and ought to engage us to a zealous and hearty ſupport of the King of *Pruſſia* and Electorate of *Hanover*. But, were I addreſſing myſelf to an aſſembly of *Britons*, when I ſhould think I talked to brave and noble minds, I ſhould hope generous and diſintereſted motives would be ſtronger with the people of *England*, upon whoſe approbation depends the efficacy of the reſolutions of the *Britiſh* ſenate: for, I truſt, the ſentiments of ingenuity are native with *Engliſhmen*, whoſe birthright it is to be free-born. Let me therefore beg your attention to one thing more, which, I own, carries with it, in my opinion, an irreſiſtible force in conſidering this matter.

We

Great Britain is now engaged in a war with *France*. This war, I have endeavoured to ſhow, is truly a *Britiſh* war, begun on *Britiſh* principles, and for the ſake of *Britain*. Not for its leſſer intereſts or concerns neither, but for its eſſential and moſt valuable rights.

I aſk now, abſtractedly from the conſideration of that real intereſt, which I have ſubmitted, if we have not as a part, and a great part, of the general Community of *Europe*, and as head of the Proteſtant religion and cauſe of Liberty, an intereſt in every commotion that is ſtirred by *French* ſchemes and politicks in this quarter of the globe, independent of that intereſt, which ſtrikes too, as I have endeavoured to ſhow, at the very root of our being, as a great and free nation? We are now fighting with *France* for the moſt valuable poſſeſſions we have, our colonies and ſettlements in *America*; for the dominion of the ſea; for our trade and commerce, which are the ſources of the figure the *Britiſh* empire makes in the world.

The cauſe of the war, you will grant me, is to defend againſt encroachments upon our undoubted rights and property as a nation; to reſiſt the attempts of the *French* govern-

ment

ment to poſſeſs themſelves of territories to which they have no juſt claim; to repell invaſions on our own dominions, and fruſtrate devices for adding to theirs, in a manner, and to an extent, abſolutely inconſiſtent with the ſecurity, and deſtructive of the value of the eſtabliſhment we enjoy in the weſtern part of the world. And when we began this war, (or rather to defend againſt *France*, which had begun it,) in a way I will maintain was no leſs juſtifiable than neceſſary, highly conſiſtent with the law of nations, I mean by repriſals, though no publick declaration of war was made, was not all *Europe* at peace, except the common enemy? Was there the leaſt diſturbance abroad? Indeed we ſee what combuſtible materials the ſyſtem of *Europe*, or the powers that compoſe it, are made up of: How ſoon they can be ſet on fire! *French* policy can eaſily throw in the ſquib, and preſently all *Europe* is in a flame: but what was the cauſe or occaſion of all the quarrels we now ſee? Was it not the war begun betwixt *England* and *France?*

Would the Empreſs have thought of attacking *Pruſſia* without a *French* alliance? Would *France* have dreamed of an union with its natural old and inveterate enemy,

its perpetual rival, the Houſe of *Auſtria*, on any other conſideration than to diſconcert the meaſures, and diſtreſs the government, of *Britain*?

Is there any body fooliſh enough to believe it is out of regard to the Empreſs-Queen that *France* has joined in a league with her, and buoys her up (for I doubt if there be any ſuch intention in the Court of *Verſailles*) with the hopes of recovering *Sileſia*, to which I am ſure the Houſe of *Auſtria* has not a better, if ſo good a title, as to thoſe parts of her ancient poſſeſſions which the Crown of *France* has at different times wreſted from her, and now retains, to the much greater detriment of *Europe*, and danger of the ballance of power? No. I dare ſay nobody entertains any ſuch notions. But the thing does not reſt upon arguments and ſuppoſitions. Are not we all ſenſible that the happy turn, as we eſteemed it, and as it really was, which we got the Councils of *Europe* to take, produced this ſtrange and unexpected conjunction abroad.

Wiſely, I do ſay, (for it is a juſt tribute to give praiſe where it is due) did our Miniſtry, whoever they were, foreſee, that no ſooner ſhould we break with *France*, than ſhe, in her

her ordinary way, would ſet to work to raiſe a flame in *Europe*, to kindle up a general war on the Continent; being fully acquainted with the good effect of ſuch policy in former diſputes with us. Inſomuch that now-a-days we may be as ſure, as we declare war with *France*, the fire ſhall immediately break out abroad: foreſeeing this, I ſay, our Miniſtry began with forming ſuch connections on the Continent, as were abſolutely neceſſary, and well calculated to prevent the bad effects of *French* ſchemes there.

Senſible of the error of laſt war in that reſpect, the Adminiſtration was deſirous effectually to take off the King of *Pruſſia* from his alliance with *France*, which then had ſuch pernicious conſequences, and to bring him to the ſide that was more natural for him.

To ſecure this great point, and to prevent the miſchiefs that it was once before brought to remedy, we began this time with a *Ruſſian* treaty; and like a charm it wrought; for immediately after, an alliance was concluded with the King of *Pruſſia*: in making which, the conduct of thoſe then at the helm muſt be approved, who gave up trifles, and yielded ſmaller matters, which, had they been ten times more, it was wiſdom not to inſiſt on,

for the ſake of procuring ſo neceſſary and ſo uſeful an ally.

So far we were lucky; that if it was with reaſon objected to our former conduct, that we had been guilty of ſome errors in the firſt concoction, which alienated the King of *Pruſſia* from us, now that blunder was redreſſed, and it was a great ſtroke in politicks, have the praiſe who will. It was matter of joy to compaſs that point, to bring the King of *Pruſſia* off from *France*, and unite him to the Proteſtant, which to be ſure is his natural intereſt; and which, I dare ſay, he at no time wanted inclination to ſupport: for Religion, though not ſo forcible a motive as it has been, has yet its own effect, even where we do not look for the greateſt ſhare of its intrinſick virtue. Proteſtant and Papiſt, Bigot and Heretick, are terms of importance yet in the world. Perſecution, and Liberty of Conſcience, are conſiderations that muſt operate on the minds of men, and will, even with Princes, be their indifference to ſerious piety never ſo great.

This then was done; an alliance effectuated with the King of *Pruſſia*: and I dare ſay nobody could have imagined that the Empreſs-Queen was to forſake us. It would have

have been ſtrange to ſuppoſe (though now we ſee it), that a family, for which we had ſo lately laviſhed our blood and treaſure, to protect her againſt *France*, ſhould now take part with her own enemy againſt us, when our wounds in her cauſe were yet ſo freſh, that we have hardly ſtrength left to defend ourſelves. I hope this ſame conduct of our old ally, which was never to have been ſuſpected, now that it has appeared, may be a leſſon to us; for it may teach us the value of popiſh faith.

However, ſo it is in fact, that not only did *France*, when ſhe ſaw ſhe had loſt the King of *Pruſſia*, attempt, but which is more wonderful, ſhe has ſucceeded in perſuading the Empreſs Queen, which it could hardly have been thought any motives, promiſes, or profeſſions, could have done, that it was her intereſt to take that ſide; which, in the end, ſhe may repent, when ſhe perceives the deluſion, by failing, even with the powerful aſſiſtance ſhe has truſted to, to attain what ſhe is in queſt of.

And is it not owing to the ſame intrigue, and from the ſame ſource, that the change we perceive in the ſentiments of the *Ruſſian* court proceeds? I am hopeful we ſhall not

feel

feel much bad effect from the lukewarmneſs, or, if it ſhould ſo happen, the unfriendly meaſures of that northern Princeſs *: but certain it is, if it was the *Ruſſian* treaty that produced the *Pruſſian* alliance, it has been the latter that changed the views of the court of *Peterſburgh*; and for a plain reaſon I need not mention.

That power wiſhes to have an influence in the nearer part of *Europe*; the road to which was, till very lately, to them an untrodden path; and to ſecure a proſpect of ſome profit to itſelf from the occaſional neceſſities of the more ſouthern ſtates.

Now taking all theſe things together, is it not plain, that the King of *Pruſſia* at preſent ſuffers in the *Britiſh* quarrel? He had no motive or occaſion to enter into a war himſelf. Nobody can find fault with any thing he wanted, or had in view to obtain: but, no ſooner does he enter into an engagement with us, than, by the intrigues of *France*, and in hopes of her ſupport promiſed and accordingly granted, and doubtleſs alſo on the faith of *Ruſſian* aid, *Pruſſia* is pointed out as the bait, and devoted as the

* The court of *Peterſburgh* had not openly declared itſelf, when this was wrote.

ſacrifice, to entice the Empreſs Queen to attack him, with the aſſiſtance of her old friend the Elector of *Saxony*, King of *Poland*; who, it ſeems, had not ſo eaſily forgot what he ſuffered laſt war, as he neglected to remember what was the cauſe of it, and in whoſe quarrel it was that he was then almoſt deſtroyed.

And is not the concluſion obvious, that we ought, that we are bound to the utmoſt of our power to ſupport the King of *Pruſſia*, and make good the engagements to which we cauſed him to truſt? He is involved in a war, for no other reaſon, but that, inſtead of being againſt us, he agreed to be with us: and ſuffer what he will, it is on our account. If therefore we permit him to be ſacrificed, eſpecially ſo recently after we, with profuſion, aſſiſted that family, never ſo naturally connected with us, and whoſe principles and intereſt are no ways ſo co-incident with ours, I think we ſhould incur the cenſure both of folly and ingratitude, as well as want of faith; we ſhall do what is abſolutely wrong in itſelf, and what will in the end take its own revenge; as it cannot be, that the King of *Pruſſia* ſhould ſuffer, and we and the common cauſe, which we ought to have

at

at heart, receive no hurt: not to ſay, that if we deſert him, it may provoke, and even force him to a meaſure, which another Power, notwithſtanding all that has happened, will be ready enough to fall in with; but which *Europe* in general, and this country in particular, would, if I miſtake not, have ſad cauſe to lament.

Good faith to allies has always been a maxim of every wiſe government. By this the *Romans* made their alliance be eſteemed the greateſt privilege or advantage that any ſtate could attain; and they ſhewed the ſame reſentment for injuries done their allies as themſelves. Therefore it is that *Cicero*, with reaſon, ſays, That *Rome* became the miſtreſs of the world by defending her confederates. And that great orator *Reetſons* places indifference to oppreſſion, where-ever exerciſed, and abandoning confederates, among the vices univerſally confeſſed to be the moſt odious. His words are: "Thoſe "who make no reſiſtance againſt, or oppo- "ſition to an injury, when they have it in "their power, are equally guilty with thoſe "who abandon their Parents, their Country, "or their Confederates."

After

After ſaying ſo much in regard to *Pruſſia*, let me add but a word in the ſame view as to *Hanover*. And I call upon the man that can tell me, what quarrel *France* has with that Principality, or what pretence ſhe has to diſtreſs it, if it is not that the King of *England* is its Sovereign? A reaſon is hardly alleged: but it is imagined, and very juſtly, that it will diſtreſs us, if *Hanover* is attacked; becauſe, upon the principles of our known honour, as well as for our intereſt, we muſt defend it: ſo that the thruſt is truly at us, tho' the attack be on *Hanover*.

But, alas! is that really the caſe, and are we not bound by ties of the moſt ſacred nature to take the part I am arguing for? Is an injury done them on our account; and ſhall we not reſent it? Nay, more; Is *Hanover* attacked becauſe *Hanoverians* came here for our internal defence and ſecurity againſt a *French* invaſion; and is that plea of no force for our protection againſt the ravages threatened in revenge for the ſeaſonable aſſiſtance afforded us?

Or is *Hanover* attacked for fear it ſhould be of any uſe to the King of *Pruſſia?* on whom, it is too evident not to be diſcerned by the *French*, depends the fate of all their ſchemes on the continent; as, if he is de-

ſtroyed, all goes with them to their wiſh; whereas, if he ſtand his ground, they fail of their attempt. And ſtill in that view, is it not our duty as well as our intereſt to defend *Hanover?* We hear, and we have no reaſon to doubt it, that *France* has offered the King a neutrality for his Electoral dominions, on condition his Majeſty, in quality of Elector, does not take part in the war in *Germany*; but that his Majeſty has, with all the tempting circumſtances of the offer, rejected it as inglorious *. He will not forſake the King of *Pruſſia*, after involving him in the war: he will not ſit quiet, and ſee his natural ally ſuffer on his account, or on account of this country; nor will he permit ſuch a ſtroke to be given to the Proteſtant intereſt abroad, as a blow to the King of *Pruſſia* would be; at leaſt ſo far as his aſſiſtance can prevent it.

The King of *Pruſſia* has riſked all he has: his very crown, as I have ſaid, he has ſtaked for that cauſe, which I have ſo often, and yet I cannot too much repeat it, called the cauſe of Liberty, and of the Proteſtant Religion: and the King of *Great Britain*, as Elector of *Hanover*, bravely reſolves to ſtand and fall

* The E. of *H*———*s*, S———y of St—e, declared ſo in the H—e of L—s.

with

with his Proteſtant and natural ally: and they will, I hope, together, be the ſupport of the good cauſe. But the conſequences, in the mean time, we ſee are, that the Electorate of *Hanover* is now in the jaws of the lion; a great army ready to pour in upon them; which, I think, calls upon us, by every tie of ingenuity and intereſt, to interpoſe with our moſt powerful aſſiſtance.

I am far from ſaying, that *Hanover*'s own proper ſtrength ſhould not be exerted; becauſe I have no notion that its Sovereign can think of ſparing any means in his own power: the beſt proſpect he can have of aſſiſtance from us cannot tempt him to ſo abſurd a conduct. To me it is impoſſible to conceive, that any Prince, much leſs ſo wiſe a one as we know his Majeſty is (not to avail myſelf of the goodneſs of his inclinations, which is equally inconteſtible), will ſuffer his dominions to be deſtroyed, when he has it in his power to ſave or ſecure them: and therefore, not doubting but his Majeſty will do the utmoſt that his ſtrength admits of in his Electoral capacity, we ought to do all we can to prevent his country's ſuffering from any reſolution taken by its Prince out of regard to us and our intereſt.

I cannot help mentioning, on this occaſion, a rule which we muſt allow to be binding, becauſe it is of eternal obligation; I mean, the great golden rule of *doing as we would be done by*; and I the rather mention it, becauſe I have already, in the courſe of the argument, ſaid, that nations have a moral character, and are under moral obligations, as well as private perſons: and the influence of this rule we ſhall eaſily diſcover, if we apply it to the preſent caſe.

We have often heard the common topic of popular clamour, *Hanover*, *Germany*, and the Continent; that this country is ſacrificed to *German* connections; and, in ſhort, that all our continental ſchemes and operations are only for the ſake of *Hanover*.

I have endeavoured to ſhew a real and radical connection between this country and the affairs of the continent; and that the true *Britiſh* ſyſtem, more eſpecially when compared with that which *France* ſteadily purſues, neceſſarily obliges us to interfere in them: that ſuch was the ſyſtem, and the rational and wiſe conduct of *Britain*, long before we had any connection with *Hanover*; and that our own eſſential and valuable intereſt required it ſhould be ſo. I have alſo taken the liberty to maintain, that regarding

Hanover

Hanover merely as an ally, a Proteſtant ally, and one with which we are connected in the way of national intereſt, ſhe is intitled to our aſſiſtance and connection; and I will once more repeat, that I conceive nothing more unworthy the notion that the true ſpirit of *Britiſh* government inſpires, than that baſe idea, that we ought, if we could with ſafety to ourſelves (which never can be the caſe), to be wrapt up in a ſelfiſh indifference to the reſt of the world, the Chriſtian and Proteſtant world; and that, I truſt in God, however gloomy our preſent proſpects may ſeem, this country will never be ſo far reduced, as not be to able to give effectual aſſiſtance to thoſe that need it, eſpecially our friends. Were we as wiſe as we ſhould be, this nation might yet hold the ballance in her own hands, as ſhe has done heretofore, when, *Neptune*-like, ſhe ſhook her trident, and the kingdoms trembled. Such, from the advantageous circumſtances that nature and commerce have placed us in, ought to be our character in *Europe*, our friends to revere and truſt us, and our enemies to be afraid of us.

But I mean not now to inſiſt any more on theſe conſiderations, which are fit to operate

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on noble and generous minds, and to inflame the ſparks of *Britiſh* dignity that ſhould be found within our breaſts. I was going to ſay, that, in ſtrict juſtice, and by the ſtrongeſt ties of moral equity, we are as much bound to aſſiſt *Hanover* at preſent, as to ſecure ourſelves; and it is founded upon what has been already obſerved, that the quarrel is with *Britain*; that *France* has no pretence of war with *Hanover*; and that it is on our account, and not her own, ſhe ſuffers, and for the part ſhe has taken at our inſtance: ſo that ſhe now may well return the compliment that has been ſo often paid to her in this country, when the cry has been, That we were ſacrificed to the intereſt of *Hanover*.

Let us but, for once, change ſides (which is the faireſt way of judging), and ſuppoſe we were the ſubjects of *Hanover*, ready to be over-run by a *French* army, and for no cauſe that they know, or can know, becauſe really there is no other but this one, that the *French* King is at war with *England*; and I aſk, Have not they good reaſon to ſay, in their turn, that they are ſacrificed to *England*, and to wiſh they had no connection with our iſland? The argument ſtrikes home; every man's own breaſt feels its force.

As, then, it is our quarrel, and our cauſe, we ought to treat it accordingly: the motives of juſtice, as well as generoſity and intereſt, concur to demand it of us.

I do not however ſay, that now, more than on any former occaſion, we are to give the aſſiſtance juſtly expected of us imprudently, either beyond proper bounds, or in an improper manner: let us be governed in theſe reſpects by every wiſe conſideration. It is the meaſure itſelf I argue for, truſting the manner of its execution to thoſe whoſe province it is; whom I eſteem better judges in that matter, than to need any inſtruction, were it proper for me, or were I capable, to give it; and who are, in every part of their conduct, accountable to their King and Country, and particularly now, and to what good end they lay out the public treaſure.

The argument I have inſiſted on, at ſome length, in favour of the King of *Pruſſia* and of *Hanover*, or rather for the neceſſity and of obligation we are under, both in reſpect of duty and intereſt, to aſſiſt the King of *Pruſſia* and *Hanover*, is likewiſe applicable to the caſe of the Prince of *Heſſe Caſſel*, who has alſo been mentioned, and whoſe preſent ſituation we all know.——But I cannot diſmiſs the ſubject without

without ſaying a word as to him in particular, becauſe of ſome circumſtances in which he is ſingularly unfortunate.

It is no ſecret, ſince all the gazettes and newspapers have publiſhed it, that this Prince has alſo been offered a neutrality, on condition he would withdraw his troops; and this he has refuſed. Tho' deſtruction is at the very door, and, for aught human knowlege can foreſee, he muſt be ſacrified, and his country overrun, he ſtands inflexible. A virtuous man, in diſtreſs for his virtue, challenges not only pity, but even reverence: but a Prince or a Country ſuffering for an adherence to the cauſe of Virtue, Religion, and Liberty, is a venerable figure: and who would ſee it, and not endeavour to relieve it?

The preſent ſituation of the Prince of *Heſſe*'s family is a farther conſideration that adds to my concern in his behalf. I ſay nothing of the connection we have with his family by our near alliance, tho' that is not altogether to be forgotten, as the ſtrength of the branches of our Royal Family abroad is for the advantage of the common cauſe: but what I have now in my eye is, the unhappy change of religion which the apparent heir of that Prince has made, to the great hurt of

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the Proteſtant intereſt abroad. —— This is a circumſtance which, with me, goes much deeper than it would, conſidered only as an affliction, however great, to that Prince. I cannot help viewing it in a more general light: and I think it affords matter for reflection, which might be advanced in corroboration of the general doctrine I have been endeavouring to maintain, and conſequently add weight to the argument that has been founded upon it.

Religious ſyſtems are nearly connected with civil policy; and it is a great point in the latter to promote and extend the former: but in this the Proteſtants fall vaſtly ſhort of the Papiſts, though the reaſon is equally ſtrong for both. It is from that real connection between religion and policy, that I have ſo often ſpoken of the Proteſtant Cauſe, and the Cauſe of Liberty, as one and the ſame: and I do not only mean Religious Liberty, which is deſtroyed by that perſecution for conſcience ſake practiſed by the *Romiſh* church, which convinces men by fire and faggot, when every other argument and all reaſon fails; but it is Civil Liberty I have chiefly in my eye; to which there is not a greater enemy than the *Romiſh* religion,

and conſequently nothing that ſhould alarm us more than its gaining ground, or the decline of the Proteſtant intereſt.

The church of *Rome* has motives of a very different kind from what the Proteſtant religion admits of, to propagate their principles, which neceſſarily draw with them a power over the perſons and property of their votaries; and therefore they are zealous in extending it: and the Popiſh Princes, even when they have not religion enough themſelves to be enthuſiaſts, find their account in promoting the deſigns of the Holy See for enlarging its juriſdiction; becauſe they reap advantages of a political nature from that authority which the Pope, as the viſible head of the church, has over all of that communion; and who, as a reward for ſupporting and promoting the *Roman Catholic* religion, uſes his influence with the Princes that profeſs it to bring one court into the views of another, when diſputes and wars ariſe between different nations.

The effects of this are viſible in that aſcendant which the Moſt Chriſtian King, the eldeſt ſon of the church of *Rome*, has in Chriſtendom, and which puts ſo much ſtrength into his hands, when diſpoſed (as that court

court always has been, and always will be) to uſe it for the diſturbance of the peace and the overthrow of the liberties of *Europe*. The Proteſtant Powers, on the other hand, as they are not always too much under the influence of that kingdom which is not of this world, and are not ſo keenly prompted by the eccleſiaſtics of a church that has no views but men's ſpiritual intereſts, let the Proteſtant religion take its chance, unmindful of its importance to their ſecular intereſts; which, if duly attended to, would of itſelf be ſufficient to inſpire them with a greater concern for the maintenance and ſecurity of it, either againſt open violence or ſecret devices, with both which it is daily beſet: and the misfortune is, that, added to all the diſadvantages which proceed from the purity of its own principles, and the bloody oppoſition it has to ſtruggle with; it has this obſtacle to its progreſs, and hindrance to its ſtability, that, inſtead of being united by our faith, as the Papiſts are, in ſo ſtrong and uſeful a degree, the Proteſtants have always been diſtracted by different opinions in religion, and are as much divided in their politics.

It cannot be ſaid they have not, but it is true they will not purſue, a common intereſt,

and promote it by joint meaſures: and as they have not an unity of religious principles, neither have they a Head to interpoſe as a mediator, to whom they would pay ſome regard, as the higheſt Popiſh Princes, from the maxims of their policy, fail not to do to his Holineſs. The conſequence of all this is, that the Proteſtant cauſe and intereſt is abſolutely deſtitute of that firmneſs and ſtrength, which the union of the Popiſh party gives them.

This is a diſmal conſequence, and merits to be well attended to at all times, eſpecially on ſuch an occaſion as this of the Prince of *Heſſe*'s changing his religion: for if we look around us in *Germany*, and conſider how much the Proteſtant intereſt has ſuffered, or, which is the ſame thing, how great an acceſſion of power the Popiſh religion has received, by the perverſion of the Electoral Houſe of *Saxony*, which, by the league of the Reformation, was placed at the head of the Evangelic Body of the Empire, and by the tranſition of the *Palatinate* to the Popiſh branch of the houſe of *Newburgh*, this unaccountable corruption of that unhappy Prince will appear terrible to any one, who has the ſmalleſt regard for the Proteſtant religion,

ligion, or conſiders the connection betwixt it and the cauſe of Liberty. So far it is lucky, that it has appeared before he was in poſſeſſion of the dominions whereof he is the heir apparent; which gives ſome hopes, that, by prudent precautions, the worſt of its effects may be prevented. And it is our duty, as a Proteſtant Power, to give all poſſible aſſiſtance to that State at this juncture, were it only to prevent any advantage being taken againſt the Proteſtant religion in *Heſſe Caſſel*, which the introduction of a victorious Popiſh army will ſo greatly favour, in the preſent mortifying circumſtances of that Prince's family, who has had the courage to venture his country and his ſovereignty for a glorious attachment to that Religion and to the Liberty of *Europe*.

It is matter of comfort, and challenges our gratitude to Heaven, that, in ſome degree to compenſate for the diminution of the Proteſtant power abroad, in the inſtances I have mentioned, Providence has raiſed up ſo great a Prince of that religion as the King of *Pruſſia*, and put ſo much power into his hands. But the imminent hazard of loſing one branch more, and, next to the Electors

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that remain, one of the moſt conſiderable of the Proteſtant intereſt in *Germany*, does, I own, awaken my concern, and perhaps adds to my zeal in behalf of theſe Princes of whom I have been ſpeaking; and give me leave to take an opportunity of ſaying, that the Prince of *Heſſe*'s conduct in particular is not only a powerful motive for ſupporting him, but a ſharp reproof to ſome parts of our own behaviour, and particularly the freedom with which we have been too much uſed to diſpenſe a certain kind of obloquy, when edged by the keenneſs of party.

Nothing has been more common among us than to talk of the *German* Princes, to whoſe aſſiſtance we have been indebted on former occaſions, as well as of late, as baſe mercenaries, who gladly took our money when there was nothing to do, but on whom we could have no dependence in a real exigency. But is it ſo with the poor Prince of *Heſſe* now, whoſe troops, after we diſmiſſed them from the friendly office of guarding our domeſtic tranquility, and, I am ſorry to ſay it, ſent them home not with all the marks of honour that I ſhould have thought them worthy of, had they come at our requeſt in a caſe of leſs real neceſſity, are now hazarding

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their lives in defence of our own Sovereign's dominions, when attacked on our account, and in ſupport of the common cauſe, and he himſelf forced to abandon his country, becauſe he refuſes to withdraw his troops from the ſcene of action. This is not enriching himſelf with the price of his ſubjects blood, which has ſometimes been the ſtyle of political ſatire, but ſuffering with them for a fidelity to his engagements with us, which loudly demands that we ſhould not be unmindful of him.

I ſhall conclude what I have to ſay with an argument for the expediency of ſupporting our allies abroad; and that is, the wiſdom of giving *France* full employment, when we have both *Britain* and *America* to defend againſt her, and of finding other work to thoſe forces that, if left at leiſure, would be employed either in invading this country, or in carrying on the war upon the other ſide of the *Atlantic*.

The war in *Germany* is a ſtrong diverſion to the power of *France*; and the King of *Pruſſia*, if properly ſupported, may, under the protection of Heaven, be able, not only to defend himſelf and our other allies, but even to give a blow to the combined ſtrength

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of *France* and *Auſtria*, that will check the boundleſs ambition of the one, and ſmartly rebuke the precipitant folly and matchleſs ingratitude of the other.

Were we ſo happy as to ſee that happen, we might, with a proper exertion of our own naval ſtrength, yet have it in our power effectually to humble the pride of *France*, pull down the common enemy, and ſettle the liberty and peace of *Europe* on ſomething like a ſolid foundation; which is never to be expected as long as *France* retains the power ſhe is already poſſeſſed of, and much leſs if ſhe yet farther enlarges her dominions, and adds to her ſtrength, by which ſhe may at laſt attain univerſal monarchy, if God has appointed ſuch a ſcourge for the end of the world.

Theſe are the things which I ſubmit as my reaſons for thinking, that it is the duty of this nation to give an attention to the affairs of the Continent, to the ſtate of religion, and of power there; and that our own particular intereſt, as well as the good of the common cauſe, demands the moſt powerful interpoſition we can make in the preſent critical conjuncture of affairs abroad.

But,

But, after all, I may be told, and indeed it has been loudly ſaid, What can we do, where we are ſo weak, and have ſo much upon our hands at home, every thing at ſtake within ourſelves, and our ſtrength almoſt exhauſted? And I doubt not but it will be added, that to the Continent we owe much of our misfortunes, and the greateſt part of the heavy burden we now groan under, and which preſſes us to the ground, and that it is therefore vain to inſiſt on either the neceſſity, utility, or expedience, of interpoſing, if we have not the means wherewithal. One that is hardly able to ſave himſelf, cannot aſſiſt another when ſinking.

I ſet out with this caution, that I would not undertake ſo difficult a taſk as to vindicate all our paſt conduct, or take upon me to affirm there had been no blunders in the management of former wars, eſpecially the laſt: but I may venture to ſay, that one error will never be rectified by another. I have admitted, or at leaſt ſuppoſed, that perhaps we went too far in the laſt *German* quarrel, farther than either our engagements to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, or a neceſſary regard to the general good of *Europe* required; and I am pretty confident that it was a miſtake to loſe

the King of *Pruſſia*'s alliance at that time, which would have been an acceſſion to the common cauſe, in my humble apprehenſion, more than ſufficient to compenſate any diminution the loſs of *Sileſia* made of the power of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, which has been conſidered as a ſort of bulwark againſt *French* ambition on the one hand, and *Turkiſh* barbariſm on the other; nor is there any queſtion that, by having done ſo much lately, we are now able to do the leſs either for ourſelves or others.

But as a reſolution to do nothing would be dangerous, neither can I allow myſelf to think we are yet reduced to the neceſſity of taking it from abſolute inability; and I know, if ſomething is not done to reſtore the equilibre that is at preſent ſo totally unhinged, I, for one, ſhall give up for loſt that cauſe which our forefathers thought worthy of the greateſt expence of blood and treaſure that it could coſt them to maintain it. And I cannot help ſaying a thing that poſſibly proceeds from my prejudices in favour of the Proteſtant religion, which is, That if we did ſo much, that I am almoſt aſhamed to mention it, for the Empreſs Queen laſt war, we muſt be black to future ages if we do not now do the very

very utmoſt we can for the King of *Pruſſia*. She, like the ſpirit of her party, and her religion, has deſerted us; with what grace, the world may read in our confuſion; and has joined herſelf to her own, as well as our, hereditary enemy, againſt us; and we cannot ſay what effects the vice of their common religion, and the malignant influence which it has over them both, may produce, when the ſtruggle is with a Proteſtant Prince, who bids ſo fair to add ſtrength to the reformed communion, if he is left to contend with them alone: but as the King of *Pruſſia* is our natural, ſo I hope he will be a faithful, becauſe he is a Proteſtant ally, unleſs he is provoked or forced to abandon the ſide he certainly muſt be biaſſed to.

His intereſt cannot alienate him from us, and his religion rather attaches him: I muſt therefore ſay, that as it goes more with my heart that we ſhould be confederate with Proteſtant powers, than with the bigots of the Popiſh faith, ſo I am the more ardent in my wiſh, that now, when we have got ſo far the better of a former blunder, as to bring the King of *Pruſſia* back to his natural bias, we ſhould aſſiſt and ſupport him againſt the com-

bination of powers which threaten, like a deluge, to overwhelm him.

And I have not any fear, as the cauſe is ſo good, but that if we are hearty in it, we ſhall find means to gratify our deſire to ſupport it. I will preſume ſo far on the inclinations of the people of *Great Britain* in behalf of that religion and liberty, the value of which is not ſo well known to any other people under the ſun, as confidently to believe that, notwithſtanding all our burdens, and all our demands for our own affairs, they will yet make a ſtretch for ſo great and noble an end; which they may do without theſe miſgivings of mind that were natural enough to ariſe in the hearts of Proteſtants, when they were aſſiſting, however neceſſary they thought it was, a family whoſe bloody perſecutions had often drawn from them cries to Heaven for vengeance againſt them.

We are not ſo weak as to deſpair, whatever the fears of ſome, and the caution of others, may ſuggeſt to them: *Britain* will yet find funds, if they are to be made a good uſe of, and we ſhall never be outdone in our inclination to raiſe them, by our enemies, who give with an aſtoniſhing pleaſure for the

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glory of their grand monarque, from whom, indeed they would not be allowed to withhold any thing neceſſary to ſupport his pretenſions to that title. We give freely, and will give chearfully to the very laſt ſhilling, when nothing leſs than all that is dear and valuable to us as Men, as *Britons*, and as Chriſtians, calls for it; and the wealth of *England* is, at this day, great, more ſo than ever it was; nor will any good citizen deſire to conceal or abſtract it from the reaſonable ſervice of the public, but every one will be rather zealous to point out the ways and means for raiſing the neceſſary ſupplies, when they know they are to be well beſtowed.

I heard it once publicly ſaid in a very great aſſembly by a great man, whoſe authority is good, becauſe his knowlege in theſe matters is conſpicuous, that, only to lay open the trade that is locked up by monopolies in this country, would, of itſelf, produce funds ſufficient to carry on any war *Great Britain* could be engaged in: and, as I think I do not altogether want reaſon to believe it true, although I had not ſuch authority for it, I am ſatisfied, that the common objections are by no means ſolid at bottom, nor any thing like a ſufficient reaſon for upholding

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ſuch murderers of commerce, as ſome of our excluſive companies are. It is amazing that in a country ſuch as this, the very being of which depends upon trade, the axe has not long ago been laid to the root of this evil, eſpecially when the uncommon exigencies of the ſtate have called for extraordinary means of raiſing the neceſſary ſupplies.

For the comfort of the timid and faint-hearted friends of their country, they might be informed, that ſome ways and means, have been ſuggeſted, and that more might be pointed out, leſs exceptionable and fully as effectual, as many of thoſe that are uſed.

We have yet no tax upon the funds; againſt the equity of which it would perhaps be hard to find an objection: for, ſuppoſing them at three and an half, or even three, *per Cent*. they yield a larger return than land, at the rate it is now bought and ſold, beſides being free of many expences and ſhort comings, that neceſſarily attend real property. And I am apt to believe, that ſuch a tax would anſwer more good purpoſes than one: for, as it certainly would raiſe a conſiderable ſum, ſo there ſeems to be ground for the obſervation which has been made, that

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it would tend to quicken and increaſe our commerce, that great ſource of private wealth and public revenue; as it would leſſen the temptation there is at preſent to lock up ſo conſiderable a part of the capital of this country in theſe dead funds, and rather force the people that have the money to employ it themſelves, or to lend it at moderate premiums to merchants, who would lay it out in trade, which at preſent languiſhes, from this among other cauſes, that the money with which it ſhould be carried on is withdrawn by the funds, where it lies little better than ruſting.

But, without entering into particulars, which might eaſily be enlarged upon, it is ſufficient to ſay, that if ſuch a political reformation were to take place, as would reſtore the now ſo much enervated frame of our conſtitution, and bring us back to the proper principles of our government, and a true public ſpirit and diſintereſted regard, not only to ourſelves, and the preſent age, but alſo to poſterity; the want of which is nothing leſs than downright deſtruction; then would it be found, that there is no want of means to raiſe, or inclination in the people to give chearfully, ſuch ſupplies, as any wiſe or honeſt

honeſt adminiſtration would demand, or the exigency of the ſtate require, according to its own ſituation and that of the reſt of the world. Then would the ſupplies be properly laid on, without a view to any other thing than merely raiſing the money at the ſmalleſt expence, and with the leaſt diſtreſs and greateſt equality to the ſubject——And be raiſed within the year, inſtead of that infernal ſcheme of perpetual mortgaging; the end of which muſt be certain ruin, and that at no great diſtance.

By this very one thing only, the ſaving to the public would be immenſe; as is evident from the calculations that have been made thereupon, the data of which cannot be conteſted. The government would, by paying ready money, or at three months credit, buy I know not how many *per cent.* cheaper, than they do at preſent, when a public contract debt is reckoned well paid, if it be diſcharged within two years: beſides the ſaving of the intereſt of the money, which, on our preſent ſcheme, muſt always be borrowed; becauſe it is to be employed before it is raiſed: and the vaſt ſums that thoſe blood-ſuckers, the ſtock-jobbers, and money-brokers rob both the public and the ſubject

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of, making to themſelves amazing fortunes at the expence of thoſe who have ſpent their blood and hazarded their lives in defence of their country.

And ſurely, if, on ſuch a ſcheme, ſo apparently ruinous, we have been able to raiſe ſuch vaſt ſums as have in fact come into the treaſury of late years (for the money is always raiſed, and raiſed once in the year too, though not for the ſupplies of that year); can any man doubt, but that, if we ſaw a plan founded in redreſſing errors, reſtoring hopes, and ſecuring our very being, every one would be glad to ſtretch the utmoſt length, and not only to bear but chearfully to contribute to, public burdens, when he ſaw a proſpect of an end to them, and to the hazard of running into abſolute perdition, by a continual increaſe of debt, and eternal taxes; which muſt be the caſe till the death of the nation puts a period to them. For as, without a true ſpirit of patriotiſm, no ſtate can ſubſiſt, ſo it is undoubtedly certain, that nothing can ſo effectually produce it in the people, as the prevalence of it amongſt thoſe entruſted with the government. Good principles are of their own nature as communicative, as bad ones are contagious; and no reformation is ſo promiſing as that which begins at the

head, as it at once takes away the example, and removes the temptations which are the cauſe of corruption in the inferior part of the ſyſtem.

In ſhort, were we to ſee ſuch proofs of a thorough attachment and aſſiduous application to the real intereſt of our country, in the important articles of public as well as private virtue, and national œconomy; we ſhould eaſily be perſuaded, that the money, prudently raiſed, was well and faithfully employed: we ſhould not hear any more cries againſt *Germany* and the Continent. The diſtractions too would ceaſe that are occaſioned by meaſures which are made a handle of to ſet the minds of the people in a ferment. Inſtead of diſſention and diviſion, a mutual confidence would prevail between the King's miniſters and ſubjects, and all, with one conſent, would concur to promote the intereſt of our country, and ſupport the common cauſe, with which it is ſo intimately connected. The heavieſt of our burdens would feel light, when we are ſatisfied, that they were neceſſary to be laid on, and profitably laid out, for the maintenance and defence of our valuable rights and poſſeſſions, and for protecting and eſtabliſhing the general peace and liberties of

Europe, and the independence of the ſeveral powers neceſſary thereto; all encroachments upon which ſo evidently tend to ſhake our own ſecurity and diſturb our quiet. Then would thoſe who are called to govern be encouraged to apply themſelves to the ſtudy of the true intereſt of the nation, and particularly to deviſe and promote every proper ſcheme for reviving and enlarging our commerce, which is the fountain of our wealth and the ſupport of our grandeur, by making wiſe regulations of trade at home, and proper commercial alliances abroad; which would prove more durable and laſting, as well as advantageous to the nation, than all the ſubſidy treaties we ever were or can be engaged in: becauſe the councils of commerce, when properly ſettled, have a permanent and mutual intereſt for their foundation, which muſt be ſurer than any preſent or temporary bait. But theſe things, however agreeable it might be to conſider them in their proper extent and tendency, are not ſo immediately connected with the ſubject I had in view, and would lead into a very wide field: therefore, ſenſible that my keenneſs has already carried me too far, I muſt beg your pardon, and aſſure you,

I am, *&c.*

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